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The collapse o f the Soviet Union represented the end of the Cold War, as 
well as the reconfirmation of the United States as the single superpower in a uni­
polar world. The world order that resulted as a consequence of the Cold War 
redesigned spheres of influence as well as international relations. The foreign 
policies of post-Soviet Russia represent a very interesting topic especially from 
the point of view of the relationship between Russia and the United States of 
America.
In my thesis I should investigate into the manner in which the relationship 
between Russia and the United States is directly shaped by the two factors, 
ideology and pragmatism, and ultimately will argue that as far as foreign policy, 
the main interest of Russia -  one that is congruent with both the “offensive 
realism” theory, and political pragmatism — is to restore its superpower status. I 
will try to analyze the reasons behind Putin's direction in foreign policy should 
there be any significant thresholds to be mentioned.
The end of the Cold War generated a new type of foreign policies that 
Russia adopted regarding the United States and the European Union. These 
policies are hard to analyze because Russia's attitude has not been linear over this 
period of time. The aim of my thesis is to achieve a theoretical understanding of 
Russian foreign policy regarding the United States of America after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union with a strong focus on Vladimir Putin's first mandate (maybe 
two mandates) as President of Russia (the period of time that extends between
2000, and May 7, 2008 when Dmitry Medvedev became Russia's third President, 
and Putin took on the role of Prime Minister). However, the present cannot be
Aim of the Thesis:
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fully understood without a close look to the past, which was dramatically shaken 
in 1991 with the collapse Soviet Union.
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1. Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War, 
as well as the reaffirmation o f the United States as the single superpower in a uni­
polar world. The world order that resulted as a consequence o f the Cold War 
redesigned spheres of influence among major powers. The foreign policies of 
post-Soviet Russia represent a very interesting topic for research especially from 
the point of view of the relationship between Russia and the United States of 
America. Post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy is characterized by a very intriguing 
interaction between ideology and pragmatism, as well as by attempts to restore its 
once privileged position within world order through a course of action which, in 
the realm of international relations, is referred to as “offensive realism. This 
empirical study investigates the manner in which the relationship between Putin's 
Russia and the United States is directly shaped by these two factors, and 
ultimately argues that, as far as foreign policy is concerned, the main interest of 
Russia -  one that is congruent with both the “offensive realism” theory and 
political pragmatism — is to restore its superpower status.
The end of the Cold War generated new types of foreign policies that
Russia adopted regarding both the United States and the West. These policies are
hard to analyze because Russia's attitude was not linear over the period of time to
be examined. Furthermore, it is especially difficult to do so due to Putin's Russia
being such an unpredictable country. Whenever there has been an attempt to
9
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anticipate Russia's next move, it has proved to be somehow misleading. Russia 
under Putin subscribed to the policies its allies followed in the event o f certain 
conflicts, and drastically differed in perspective in the case of others. The basis of 
Russia's action has been a continuous pursuit o f regional hegemony which could 
restore the great power status that Moscow lost following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. From this point of view, Russian foreign policy lies 
between doctrine and pragmatism. In order to understand this relationship, it is 
important to evaluate each of the two factors. To this aim, this paper looks at the 
definitions provided by Ludmila Selezneva as given in the book Realignment in 
Russian Foreign Policy edited by Fawn : “Ideology is a system of ideas or views 
describing attitudes to a reality, social issues and to the aspirations of classes, 
political parties and nations” (Selezneva 2003, 10). Pragmatism is defined as “a 
way of making short-term decisions, grasping opportunities to achieve practical 
results, without considering the long-term consequences and, in some cases, even 
the morality of the decisions” (Ibid). Considering the same topic, it is important to 
take into consideration the fact that ideology and pragmatism often appear to be in 
contradiction due to the fact that the former is fixed and rigid whereas the latter 
changes according to the particular course of events and the desired outcome. This 
is why a strictly ideological approach to politics is counterproductive and can
often be destructive to both political and social order.
Has Russia been successful in projecting an image of great power status in 
the changing environment? To what extent was Putin's foreign policy pragmatic
10
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or based on ideology, The aim o f .his paper is to aehieve a theoretical 
understanding of Russian foreign policy regarding the United States of America 
after the coiiapse of the Soviet Union with a strong focus on Vladimir Putin's two 
mandates as President of the Russian Federation. From this point of view, the 
present thesis is concerned with the period of time that extends between 2000 and 
2008 when Dmitty Medvedev became Russia’s third President, and Putin took on 
the role of Prime Minister. However, the task of evaluating Russia's foreign policy 
i„ the context of international relations canno, be undertaken without a brief 
historical analysis o f Soviet foreign policy. Since the topic is very recent, 
parallelism between Soviet and Russian foreign policy proves to be extremely 
useful in understanding the new direction that Putin imprinted on the relationship 
between Russia and the United States. Furthermore, the present cannot be fully 
deciphered without a close look a. the recent past when Russia was drastically
independent Russian Federation.
order to explore my topic and answer the research questions, 1
conducted research in scholarly sources, later to be complemented with primaty 
sources available on the Internet. T„e TrageJy o f  Great Po»er Politics (2001, by 
John ,  Mearsheimer, Transforation o f  Putin's reginte -  WHy T r a n s i t  is no, 
Applicable ,o Pos,-Soviet Russia? (2007), Dovile Jakniunaite in the book edited 
by Jankauskas, The Landscape o f  Russian Policy Decision Making (2005, edited 
by Dmitri Trenin and Bobo Lo, and two titles, Russian Politics and Society (2002)
11
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and Putin. Russia's Choice (2004) by Richard Sakwa are the master sources that 
gave me a better understanding of the topic.
As to the structure, the thesis is divided into six pivotal chapters, which 
offer a coherent insight into the broad issue of Russian foreign policy. While the 
Introduction deals with the research scope and its goals, the second chapter is 
devoted to theoretical framework o f this empirical analysis. The third chapter 
offers an analysis of intellectual debates that contributed to the formation of 
Russian foreign policy making in the early years of Russia’s post-Soviet existence. 
The next two chapters highlight individual factors affecting Russian foreign 
policy. These factors are not necessarily in chronological order but they have been 
chosen according to their significance and for the sake of better understanding of 
Russian foreign policy. Putin’s opposition to America at the international level and 
an U.S.-Russian relationship twilight arriving at the end of the first Putin's 
mandate are being grounds for splitting the factors into two separate chapters. 
Russia's bilateral relations with the United States as a leading force of the West 
constitute the main core of the study where the impacts on domestic and 
international determinants are examined. The two chapters further investigate how 
Russia's foreign policy under Putin responded to a changing international 
environment. The whole picture o f this analysis is complemented by a brief 
conclusion.
In regard to the thesis structure in more detail, chapter Two of this case 
study springs directly from the thesis, and provides a theoretical framework for
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the investigation of Russia's foreign policy towards the United States and the West 
as a whole. In this chapter I aim to provide background for the thesis that Russia s 
main ambition under Putin has been to regain the regional superpower status and 
to achieve regional hegemony which it had lost following the collapse ot the 
Soviet Union. The concept of “offensive realism” provides a sound theoretical 
framework for my arguments to be applied to the case of Russia during the two 
mandates of Vladimir Putin i.e. 2000-2004 and 2004-2008. “Offensive realism” 
is a concept stemming from International Relations; this paper turns to John J. 
Mearsheimer's book The Tragedy o f  Great Power Politics for the theoretical
framework.
The third chapter looks at the differences between Soviet and Russia's 
foreign policy up to 1999. This period of time can be characterized by pro- 
Western approaches in the policies of then acting foreign minister of the Russian 
Federation Andrey Kozyrev. He was a follower o f the liberal policy first 
introduced by the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Kozyrev made an effort 
to stress the otherness of the new direction which Russia was taking from the old 
“Soviet order.” However, he was replaced by Yevgenii Primakov, and later by 
Igor Ivanov, both highly critical of the West, in 1996, and 1998 respectively. This 
chapter also strives to describe the socio-economic circumstances in which 
Vladimir Putin took over the presidential office and succeeded Boris Yeltsin. The 
most important issue is related to the profile of Russian politics which changed 
during this period of time based on the fact that Russia's vision of the world was
13
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distant from a uni-polar one. Consequently, Moscow shifted to enforcement ol a 
multi-polar world order. This issue is also very much present in Putin’s mandates, 
and will be further expanded in following chapters. Much attention has also been 
devoted to analyzing the concept of identity in the Russian Federation at the end 
of this chapter. Answering the identity questions of a particular country allows 
one to better understand the policies of its government. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the birth of the Russian Federation confronted the Moscow 
government with the task of searching for a new and distinct Russian national 
identity. For this section, I have borrowed from the study by Dovile Jakmunaite in 
the book edited by Jankauskas and entitled Transformation o f Putin's regime -  
Why Transitology is not Applicable to Post-Soviet Russia? (Jakniunaite 2007).
Chapter Four of this study provides a detailed analysis of the new direction 
that Putin indicated as far as foreign policy is concerned. Putin assumed his 
mandate as President at a time when the U.S.- Russian relations seemed to point 
towards a continuation o f the Cold War (Fawn 2003, 16). Internally, Russia was 
struggling with the increasing strength of a nationalistic ideology which focused 
on the ideal of “Great Russia.” Since many people were not satisfied with the 
outcome of the multi-polar vision of the world that Russia had taken on, the past 
came back to haunt Russia, and the ideal of strong statehood spread among the 
political and academic elites. In 2000, Putin used these ideals in his campaign, and 
won, becoming Russia's President despite the fact that he did not offer any 
detailed program. His successful campaign was largely based on two concepts,
14
“Great Russia,” and “Strong Russian Statehood.” True, since he had already been 
acting President during the official campaign, he actually did not need one. 
However, these two slogans worked as magnet to which the public responded in a 
very effective manner. It took Putin over one year to put forth a set of political 
principles which, he argued, would guide him in his mandate as president. These 
principles were pragmatism, economic effectiveness, and an increased focus on 
what he defined as “national priorities” (Ibid 17). However, at this point there was 
no clear indication of the manner in which Putin envisioned Russian foreign 
policy. Nonetheless, a new direction in Russia's foreign policies indicated by 
Putin was explicit in his non-isolationist position which he expressed in autumn of
2001. In his foreign policy he partly turned away from the United States and 
directed his focus on Europe, and, in particular, the European Union for the first 
time in the post-Soviet era. One part of this chapter is therefore devoted to the 
Russia's concept of the West. As far as the United States was concerned, Russia 
has remained an opposing power which prefers multilateralism to America's 
unilateralism. In the end, it is still a matter of who holds power, and how they are 
able to use it. The aim of this chapter is to explain the Russian opposition to 
America on the global scene as well as the motives behind Russia's new direction 
that Putin declared. This new direction started to be evident prior to his re-election 
into the presidential office and became visible during his second mandate.
Chapter Five continues by investigating Russia's regime and foreign policy 
as set by President Putin during his first years o f governance, a policy further
Pavla Korandova
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consolidated during his second mandate. Putin's foreign policy became much 
more distinctive (or even imperial) when the focus shifted to building up some 
sort of union amongst the former republics of the Soviet Union. Energy policy, in 
particular, began to play a most significant role in relations with neighboring 
countries for, in order to assert Russia's power internationally, Putin had to further 
develop his doctrine o f rebuilding the state's capacity to minimize threats which 
could lead to the internal breakdown of order thereby weakening Russia's external 
security. Nevertheless, from a Western perspective, the central principle of 
Russia's policy to make itself both a democracy and great power was not entirely 
compatible. Since Vladimir Putin ascended to the presidency, Russia had been 
undergoing a transformation aimed at achieving the latter while shifting away 
from the former. On one hand, the authoritarian regime in Russia did not prevent 
limited cooperation, especially in trade and business, between Russia and the 
West. On the other hand, political relations between the United States (and the 
West) and Russia were steadily getting colder. This chapter will shed light on why 
Russia returned to its offensive policy at the international level, most visibly in its 
opposition to America; in preferring bilateral ties rather than multilateral ones to 
exercise its power (Russia with Germany, France, and Estonia, amongst others, 
rather than with the European Union, or NATO); and in the enforcement of its 
new concept of the East as an alternative to the West. Finally, major findings are 
summarized in Conclusion.
16
Pavla Korandová
2. Russia’s “Offensive Realism”
2.1 Realism as Theoretical School
Political realism has been the main coordinate in International Relations 
for over half a century. Realism that started to formulate views o f international 
relations after World War II has been the prevailing framework for understanding 
international relations. Since then it has taken on a variety of forms, be it “neo,” 
“structural” or “offensive” realism, all of which shape the understanding of 
practically every profession dealing with foreign policy, no matter whether it is in 
Europe, the United States or the rest of the world. As Fukuyama rightly puts it, 
“all realist theories start from the assumption that insecurity is a universal and 
permanent feature o f the international order, due to the latter's abidingly anarchist 
character” (Fukuyama 1992, 247). Some principles of this theoretical school 
established in the twentieth century can however be spotted in the historian 
Thucydides' writings on the Peloponnesian Wars which date back to Ancient 
Greece (Klarevas 2004). He was the first to argue that, in international politics, 
states are the primary agents. He also differentiated between major and minor 
states, and claimed that the former exert the most influence on the international 
arena. Also, Thucydides argued that states have selfish interests which represent 
the core o f their actions; he referred to these interests as “national”; among all 
possible national interests, he emphasizes that national security is the strongest. 
He also made a very important distinction between national and international 
politics by deeming that the latter is anarchic which means that on the
17
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international stage, non-state actors do not count, and that “military forces are a 
means to an end” as the most important resources in the pursuit of national 
interests (Idem).
Moreover, international law is questionable, and cannot be held as truly 
universal simply because moral values are not universal. Fukuyama in his writing 
The End o f History and the Last Man explains that Americans could see realism 
as an appropriate framework for understanding world politics after World War II, 
when the world was divided between states with conflicting ideologies. Since that 
time, the United States avoided its tendency to practice their form of liberal 
internationalism and relying on institutions such as the United Nations to seek 
their security. The ideologies which were radically differing and mutually hostile 
were the barriers for an implication of international law, a framework which 
worked in a system of liberal states. The only remedy to such a security problem 
was, according to realists, military force. Should we therefore understand the 
creation of NATO, realism provides a sufficient framework as well as explains 
how the world looked following the World War II.
In order to understand the concept of “national security,” it is important to 
first establish what the term “security” entails. For this purpose I have chosen the 
writings of Ole Waever and Arnold Wolfers. The former author claims that 
“security is about survival. In security discourse, an issue is presented as posing 
an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not 
necessarily the state). The designation of the threat as existential justifies the use 
of extraordinary measures to handle it” (Waever 2003, 1). Arnold Wolfers argues 
that the term “security” is defined as the absence of threat on core values. Thus,
18
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even if such a danger exists, a nation must wage war against it in order to 
maintain its security. He traces back the origins of this idea to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, when it referred to American policy, more precisely to 
the degree to which it promoted the welfare interest of the nation, and not those of 
powerful sub-national pressure groups. The need for a national security policy is 
mostly normative, as it describes the course o f action chosen by that state in order 
to defend its security: either “the best means to an end,” or the moral one, seen as 
“the best or least evil course of action” (Wolfers 1952, 486). Security policy can 
be seen as the expression o f a particular view, at a particular time, of how political 
relations should be organized.
2.2 Offensive Realism
Offensive realism is a type o f realist teaching in International Relations 
which argues that national interests, and not ideology, represent the main 
influence on state policies. In this sense, ideological concerns are never as 
important as those which are directly related to the survival o f a state. As John 
Mearsheimer aptly put it, “the principal motive behind great-power behavior is 
survival” (Mearsheimer 2001, 13). From this perspective, the interests o f a state 
replace ideological values in the case of foreign policy. Similarly, the theory of 
offensive realism also offers an explanation as to why states use force at the 
international level. Great powers, as Mearsheimer argues, “behave aggressively 
not because they want to or because they possess some inner drive to dominate, 
but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of 
survival” (Ibid).
19
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Understanding Russian foreign policy is not an easy task. Relying solely 
on ideology generates an incomplete and rather ambiguous answer. Applying the 
realist theory might prove more efficient in this case. This theory generates a 
rather simple answer: Russia prefers multilateralism because it is not strong 
enough to act alone on any global issue, whereas America is, hence the United 
States' preference for unilateralism in international relations. As far as future is 
concerned, Mearsheimer argues that Russia has the potential to become the 
greatest power in Europe. “If Russia successfully reforms its economy, it could 
eventually again become the most powerful nation in Europe,” he maintains. 
However, as he goes on saying, “but it would face a unified Germany and would 
not be so dominant as to require renewed active United States' intervention as an 
offshore balancer” (Mearsheimer 2001, 246).
Russia under Putin sought to increase its voice in multilateral institutions 
as its economic power rose. Consequently, Moscow began to question whether the 
Russia's WTO membership is in the state's interest since the functioning o f the 
state would be obliged to many regulations, and, furthermore, it would be under 
the control of outside agents. It was obvious that this is something which the 
Kremlin would have liked to be kept separate from. As Kuchins concisely states, 
“the Russian government for its part has become concerned that such institutions 
as the OSCE and the Council of Europe are biased against Russian interests” 
(Kuchins et al. 2005, 15). Moreover, Russia ceased to be financially dependent on 
the IMF and loans from other international financial institutions dominated by the 
United States around 2005. The Kremlin's attitudes towards the aforementioned 
international organizations or institutions prompted its rising economic confidence
20
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in relation to the country's security. Moreover, the representatives of Russia had 
begun to be both listened to and heard, with much greater respect, in the global 
community than was the case ever before.
2.3 The U.S. -Russian Relationship in History
Before the twentieth century, the United States and Russia did not have 
much interaction other than isolated events such as the purchase of Alaska by the 
United States from the czarist Russia in the 1860s. However, the start of the 
twentieth century brought about significant changes in the European and Asian 
balance of power; furthermore, the United States managed to become an 
important actor on the world stage. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought the 
Soviet regime to power, the main goal o f the Soviet leadership being to undermine 
and destroy capitalist order. The United States only recognized the Soviet 
government in 1933 when Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president. Concerns 
coincided at that particular moment in time because o f the influence and power of 
Nazi Germany was increasing in Europe in addition to Japan having invaded the 
Asian mainland. Soviet cooperation with the Western world including the United 
States was delayed until 1941, when the Soviet Union entered the Grand Alliance 
despite ideological differences in relation to the other members.
Goldgeier talks about “three basic reasons” which “brought the United 
States and Russia closer together despite their ideological differences at different 
points during the twentieth century” (Goldgeier 2001, 62). First of all, he 
mentions the fear o f growing German and Japanese power which led to the birth 
of the Grand Alliance of World War II. Realism explains this cooperation through
21
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the maintenance of a balance of power against an enemy; in this case the creation 
of the alliance led to the defeat of Hitler. Ideology thus was put aside and the 
decisive factor became military power.
Secondly, Goldgeier refers to the period of cooperative competition of the 
1970s, also known as “détente,” which marked a rapprochement between the two 
superpowers which opposed each other in the Cold War. Détente was actually the 
concretization o f the fear of nuclear war that both states shared during this 
particular period o f time due to the fact that their nuclear forces were capable of 
sustaining nuclear war. This second example shows how dangerous it could be 
when striving for answers on international security while using a moralist 
approach. During the time of the East-West détente, Kissinger recognized the 
common interest of both countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, which 
was the prevention of nuclear war, and based on that he avoided any major 
criticism of Soviet communist government. At that time, Kissinger well 
acknowledged that a change in leadership or in the ideology o f a hostile Soviet 
Union would not have any real effect on global security, and therefore it was 
better to accommodate the idea of communist power and promote cooperation 
between the two states based on higher principles. Nowadays, we can see a 
similar approach toward the foreign policy in the current administration of 
President Barack Hussein Obama.
Thirdly, the final moment when the gap between the two states seemed to 
get narrower took place during the 1990s with the partnership of Clinton and 
Yeltsin, who generally maintained good relations with the United States. As one 
of his priorities, he regarded Russia's status as an equal partner in great-power
22
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deliberations, along with a need for Western trade and investments. Clinton, 
however, did not exploit the opportunities which were at stake. As per Brzezinski 
(2007, 184), the so-called “Bill and Boris Show” (Kuchins 2004, 91) failed to 
“create a wider framework of accommodation that might have averted some 
looming dangers. Proliferation was not tackled with determination.” Nevertheless, 
a good relationship between the two leaders could have influenced the President 
of Russia to some extent. It was Yeltsin who, in 1996, accepted the need for a 
peaceful political resolution of the two-year lasting first Chechen conflict 
providing for a withdrawal of Russia's federal forces from Chechnya having 
signed a truce agreement with the Chechen leadership.
Yeltsin regarded good relations with the United States as being of 
paramount importance and despite some criticism he turned his blind eye at the 
admission of new members to NATO, or at the American military actions in the 
armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia (Remington 
2008, 101).
Terrorist attacks against the United States have re-shaped American 
foreign policy following the end o f the Cold War. The World Trade Center 
bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City killings in 1995, attacks against the U.S. 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and, finally, September 11 and the 
anthrax attacks in 2001 have determined a different list of priorities as far as 
American foreign policy is concerned. Nonetheless, there have been countless 
debates on whether or not the issue of terrorism should indeed be at the forefront 
of American public interest. The U.S. counter-terrorism policy in the wake of 9/11 
was built to counteract both state-sponsored and independent terrorist groups, and
23
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its main tool has been military intervention. Aside from the effect that the war on 
terrorism has had on the American agenda, it has also greatly influenced 
international relations.
2.4 Terrorism as a Link for U.S. -  Russian Cooperation in the Twenty First 
Century
Terrorism is a form of struggle, behind which are particular organizations 
or groups of people with their own political goals. The instrument that they use is 
immoral killing o f large masses of innocent civilians. This form of political 
struggle has been well known in Europe and czarist Russia since the nineteenth 
century. However, the phenomenon of modem terrorism has only been discovered 
by the United States quite recently. The security question in the United States is 
therefore particularly sensitive.
Until 9/11 America had been enjoying its position o f global superpower, 
the winner of the Cold War and someone, whose own security had not been 
dramatically shaken since World War II. The United States had been regarded as 
an oasis of peace in a world of permanent conflicts and instability. It is the matter 
of fact that for its allies, America was a guarantor of world of stability and 
security. All conflicts the United States was involved in were taking place on 
somebody else's soil. However, its inviolability was dramatically shaken by a 
small group o f people as they knew where to strike this democracy in order to 
undermine its international role. The response from the United States to the 
attacks of 9/11 had a global impact. Some of the new partners of America in the 
War on Terror proclaimed by President George W. Bush, however, could only see
24
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their own profits, or had their own interests which were to remain hidden to the 
blind eyes of the representatives of the campaign against terrorism.
One of these remarkably odd ready-to-be partners was the President ot the 
Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Here, as prominent critics of this theory say, 
realism holds that “the intention is always, in some sense, there” (Fukuyama 
1992, 249). “Even if today a country looks friendly and nonbelligerent, its mood 
could change tomorrow [...] Military capabilities constitute in themselves 
indicators of intent” (Ibid).
The United States and Russia have experienced the most brutal attacks by 
radical Islamic-based terrorist groups in the last decade. Both countries have this 
common interest to eradicate the sources of terrorism in order to prevent the 
emergence of any further deadly attacks.
O f course, beside this common interest of Washington and Moscow, there 
have been other common challenges which would require the cooperation of these 
two countries: to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, ensuring that weapons 
of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of any terrorist groups, or prevention 
of the emergence of more nuclear-armed countries, especially in rogue states such 
as Iran or North Korea, or ensuring China's political and economical rise into a 
responsible global partner.
2.5 Putin's Realist Approach
At the beginning of the twenty first century, Putin's realist approach led 
Russia to the club of great powers. He was able to recognize the main objectives 
of his country, grasped the opportunities which were at stake in order to raise
25
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Moscow's influence in leading not only regional, but also global decision making 
process. He tolerated the presence of American forces in the Middle East and 
post-Soviet Central Asia to let “the others,” with the minimum of his own costs or 
efforts, combat for something which was also in Russia's interest. Brzezinski, 
among others, holds that the new central arena of global politics -  the Middle East 
-  has become a center of fire where “American policy has divided its friends 
while uniting its foes” (Brzezinski 2007, 193). Despite the fact that many people 
in the Middle East want democracy, there has been much anti-Americanism in the 
region. Furthermore, the unilateral decision to invade Iraq provoked an American- 
European split. Putin, thus, could begin to play his role on the international scene 
and promote Russian interests. Nothing could do him more favor than the 
undermined moral purpose o f American power, skepticism about their policy, and 
rising anti-Americanism in the region of Moscow’s vital interests, as well as in 
Russia itself. The antipathy of the Arab world was slowly turning away from 
Russia and directed itself more on Western democracies, led by the United States.
Putin put a firm wedge between America and Europe without making 
much of an effort. The 9/11 attacks on America materialized out of blue and Putin 
made the most of it. Furthermore, he pragmatically recognized the key challenge 
for Russia, which was economics. Putin was aware that Russia's role in the group 
of great industrial powers would be highly dependent on economic growth and the 
promotion of its national resources. Without these, Russia would have had a much 
longer and winding road to articulate its national interests. Putin's goal was to 
avoid being isolated from the great powers, especially from Western Europe and
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the United States, which would have otherwise led to economic, security, 
informational and technological marginalization (Kuchins et al. 2005, 7).
2.6 Geopolitics in the Realist Approach
Geographical limitations such as bodies of water, or large distances are 
also very important in the equation o f power. These kinds of obstacles do not act 
as protection for smaller states in the face of threat from great powers, but they 
keep great powers from each other, and limit the risk for confrontation. In 
addition, offensive realism focuses on regional hegemony which also benefits 
from geographical advantages. Mearsheimer insists that “land power is the 
dominant form of military power in the modem world” (Mearsheimer 2001, 42). 
From this point of view, the main goal for modem states is regional hegemony. 
And Russia is no exception.
Fukuyama in his writing The End o f  History and the Last Man states that 
“striving for power is not affected by the internal characteristic o f states” 
(Fukuyama 1992, 247). In case of Russia, this means that there had been the same 
thirst for expansion no matter if there was a Bolshevik form of government or 
czarist rule. Therefore, we could expect that any future Russian government 
would have the same expansionist tendencies because “expansionism represents 
an expression of the Russian people's will to power” (Ibid). If any actor on the 
international scene felt insecure, he would take measures which, in the case o f a 
power such as Russia, mean the temptation to take advantage of its neighbors.
At the beginning of the twenty first century, Russia found itself in a 
geopolitical position, which it perceived as a threat to its national interests. First
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of all, in a multilateral globalized world, it is only a matter of time when new huge 
global players would emerge. Both China and India, which are potential global 
players, have been rapidly developing during the last decade and could become 
new challenges to Russia from its East and South. With the expansion of NATO 
eastwards, Russia could no longer feel safe since NATO has always been 
perceived by Russians as a part o f Western policy aimed at Russian containment. 
NATO has also been perceived as intentionally excluding Russia from Europe and 
attempting to place the good will of Russia in jeopardy to stay on good terms with 
the West, including the United States, along with Eastern Europe. The 
enlargement o f NATO to include the countries of Eastern Europe and its advance 
towards Russia's borders confirmed its status as a powerful actor in the global 
scene even following the collapse of totalitarian regimes with the end of Cold 
War. To Moscow's resentment, NATO not only ceased to exist but has become 
even more unified.
Beside these perceived threats emanating from an enlarged NATO, Russia 
could not feel safe for other reasons: Russia's southern borders separate the 
country from the rather weak states which have also been the bridge to the center 
of the capricious Islamic world.
Regional hegemony comes at a cost. The states which have hegemony in a 
certain region fear that other states, in other parts of the world, might also have 
the same goal. By forming alliances with neighboring states, smaller states could 
come to represent a real military threat to the hegemonic state. The case o f the 
United States is very interesting. The United States, according to Mearsheimer, 
“has achieved as much power as it can" (Mearsheimer 2001, 57) considering its
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geographical limitations. Their main concern, Mearsheimer argues, is to maintain 
power, but even more importantly, to prevent other states from achieving the same 
type of regional hegemonic power. If this were to occur, it would represent a 
considerable threat to the United States, a hegemonic power, and Russia who is 
trying to become one in its region o f the world.
The American Monroe Doctrine provides us with a good example o f a 
country’s regional hegemony. In fact, Mearsheimer argues that “today, only the 
United States has achieved this status -  largely because o f the absence of any 
other great powers in the Western Hemisphere. It ardently strives to prevent any 
other great power from achieving similar status in either Europe of Asia” 
(Mearsheimer 2001, 192). The American Monroe Doctrine holds that the rest of 
the world should not intervene in the United States' sphere of influence i.e. in 
North or South America. Russia followed the example of the Monroe Doctrine 
and issued a “Russian Doctrine,” defining “the whole area o f the former Soviet 
Union as one vital to Russian national interests” (Sakwa 2002, 353). However, 
this would mean exclusion, not in economic terms though, of other international 
players in the region determined by Moscow to be in the Russian sphere of 
influence.
Putin embodies this theory of international relations perfectly. He has a 
profound understanding o f modem politics which enables him to grasp the 
importance o f international cooperation especially with Western countries. 
Regarding the latter, Putin was aware o f the fact that there was a huge gap 
between Russia and the Western world as far as economic development. 
Moreover, as President of Russia, he was able to see the inextricable link between
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economic development and military power, and came to understand that security 
exists only in the presence of a developed national economy (Fawn 2003, 49). The 
best example of his determination to make Russia's economy more efficient was 
in 2002 when he publicly addressed the government urging them to focus on 
possibly exceeding economic growth targets (Idem). His realism transcends 
national boundaries; Putin was always aware that in order to be able to compete 
with Western economies, Russia needed to become more competitive. However, 
as the international climate is itself highly competitive, Russia was facing a 
double challenge: first o f all, there was the domestic challenge of increasing 
economic growth, and secondly, the threat posed by more developed economies. 
In this sense, Putin encouraged cooperation with other states, especially the most 
powerful ones, and pushed for membership in the most important international 
organizations. During his two mandates, Putin consolidated his belief in 
integration and international cooperation as valid strategies for increasing Russia's 
influence at the global level.
2.7 Russia as a Regional Superpower?
Russia thrives to become a regional superpower for many reasons. If I 
omit the ideological reasons, which as I claim are always there, I would stress that 
Russia simply continues to dominate the post-Soviet region for reasons of history, 
culture, geography, economics and politics. Moreover, Russia's military forces, 
without any doubts, remain to be most powerful in the region ensuring this status 
with the presence of armed forces in some of the states o f the former Soviet 
Union.
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The region of Central Asia has become a new center of global struggle. 
The one who will be controlling this region will gain the status of superpower in 
whole Eurasia. Nevertheless, in the twenty-first century this region attracts many 
global actors. Besides the United States and Russia, there are other countries such 
as China, India, and the Muslim world, that are aware o f the strategic importance 
of this part of Eurasia. The combination o f the natural resources such as oil or gas, 
and the instability of this region cannot leave anybody uninterested. In case the 
region was left behind, it could become self-destructive, which would have 
overwhelming consequences for the entire world.
The United States, for its part, is largely preoccupied with the enormous 
amount o f tasks when promoting peace and stability in this region, preventing the 
emergence of non-friendly regimes, as well as proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Although these are the factors which should have promoted close 
relationship of Russia with the United States in the recent past, the competing 
visions and goals of either of the two prevent deep cooperation. If there have been 
any “liked-to-be close relationship” since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they 
never lasted for long as they were condemned to fail sooner or later.
2.8 Security in the Realist Approach
During the period that this paper addresses, the United States has 
maintained regional hegemony, and has extended its power in both Europe and 
Asia, i.e. Russia's two continents. The theory of offensive realism holds that 
aspiring great powers will eventually clash with regional hegemonies in other 
regions of the globe because hegemonic powers will try to extend their
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domination over regions o f the world other than the ones they come from. In other 
words, an aspiring superpower such as Russia will directly confront the United 
States, a superpower whose sphere of influence and control has extended far 
beyond its geographical borders. On the assumption that the United States 
attempts to dominate Europe and Asia, Russia will respond by consolidating its 
position as an aspiring superpower. From this point o f view, Russian attempts to 
become either a regional hegemonic power, or a great power, will automatically 
generate direct confrontation with the United States.
Putin openly stated his opposition regarding the U.S. National Missile 
Defense in 2001, only one year into his first mandate. Russia's president followed 
the footsteps o f the Russian legislative which placed reservations onto the 1993 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. These reservations enabled Russia to 
withdraw from the treaty if  the United States violated the 1972 Anti-ballistic 
Missile Treaty (The NATO-Russia Archive). Russia's adherence to the original 
doctrine MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) can be explained using the same 
realistic theory o f international relations which dominates Russia's foreign policy. 
Even though there are clear disadvantages to maintaining the MAD doctrine, such 
as total annihilation for both the United States and Russia, abandoning it would 
generate more losses for Russia than the United States. This can be explained by 
the fact that the United States has the economic and technological conditions 
needed to work on a missile defense system which would act as an anti-nuclear 
shield for the country. Russia does not benefit from such an option. The theory o f 
offensive realism can account for Russia's interest in maintaining the MAD 
strategy in order to safeguard its own interest (Ibid). This is only one example
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which sheds light on Russia's foreign policies regarding America. Another 
example resides in Russia's ambiguity concerning the legitimacy o f NATO's 
military actions in Kosovo. Although its official position was one of opposition to 
the NATO military campaign, Russia's economic dependence on the West did not 
allow Kremlin to fully express its opposition. Nevertheless, Sakwa interprets the 
doubts emanating from Moscow as follows: “Yugoslav wars forcefully raised the 
dilemma in Russian foreign policy: Would alliance with the West (the Atlanticist 
approach) take precedence over Russia's traditional great-power interests in the 
Balkans...?” (Sakwa 2004, 369)
2.9 Putin's Legal Prerogatives
The task o f understanding President Putin's foreign policy cannot be 
undertaken without acquiring an understanding of his legal prerogatives under the 
constitution, as well as the functioning o f Russia's system of government. 
Nominally, Russia is a semi-presidential system which follows the model of 
France. However, there are a number of important differences between the two 
countries. The Russian Constitution of 1993 grants the president extensive powers 
in appointing governments, making policy, and introducing legislation. The legal 
powers of the president, according to the constitution, are a combination of 
appointed and policy prerogatives (Sakwa 2002, 103). The president is the head of 
state and the “guarantor” of the constitution. It is also the president who 
nominates not only the prime minister, but also the director of the Central Bank, 
members of the Constitutional, Supreme and Supreme Arbitration Courts, in 
addition to the Prosecutor-General. The president is also head o f the Security
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Council, confirms Russia's military doctrine, appoints the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces, and “exercises leadership of the foreign policy o f the Russian 
Federation” (Art. 86 in Sakwa 2002, 106).
Reminiscent o f the prerogatives o f the czar as defined by the 1906 
constitution, the 1993 Constitution o f Russia grants the president control over four 
key areas: security, defense, home and foreign affairs. Sakwa explains that 
“Russia's presidency in effect acts as a duplicate government, with the functions 
of ministries often shadowed by agencies under the presidency. The prime 
minister therefore exerts only partial control over his own ministers, and is 
deprived of control over the so-called “power ministries” responsible for domestic 
security. The president plays an active role in the policy process, initiating and 
vetoing legislation” (Ibid 104). The government is subordinate to the president 
who also appoints it.
The next chapter is devoted to the issue o f Russian foreign policy concept 
formation which included a struggle for defining Russia's national identity. One 
part o f this chapter attempts to explain Putin's own concept, so-called “third way.”
34
Pavla Korandová
3. Ideological Platforms of Russian Foreign Policy
3.1 Russia's Place in a Post Cold War World
Some historians, political scientists and international lawyers have argued 
that the collapse o f the Soviet Union meant that America was the “only 
superpower” or “hyper power” of the world (Boyle 2004, 173); this status implies 
that America is capable of launching an offensive attack upon any adversary. 
Their main argument being that the National Missile Defense program was, in 
fact, a critical objective o f President Bush's administration. There are harsh critics 
of the previous American Administration's foreign policy who argue that 
American foreign policy of the twenty first century still reflects the same 
distinctive American desire to dominate the world, which is frequently referred to 
as “American imperialism.” These voices are somewhat more radical, and argue 
that, for the past two centuries, America has built its imperialistic foreign policy 
upon the basis o f “racism, aggression, genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and slavery;” a specification drawn up by Boyle and 
published in his Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East 
Before and After September 11, (2004, 11). The term “imperialism” in its negative 
connotation as described above has been often used by critics in Russia to decry 
American policies which are undesirable. Some others would, however, argue that 
some form of imperialism such as democracy promotion is desirable.
The fall of the Soviet Union challenged Russia insofar as the foreign 
policy of the new state was concerned. The Russian elites were faced with the
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need to come up with a foreign policy which would reflect the national identity of 
the new state. However, these concerns were secondary as Russia found itself in 
search of a new national identity. The political elite was forced to acknowledge 
that it had little to work with in its attempt to forge a new national identity, but 
they knew that how they managed to manipulate images of the country and its 
newly-established position on the international stage would, in turn, determine the 
course of Russia's foreign policy. In fact, between 1991 and 1996, internal debates 
focused on how Russian citizens defined themselves; on the geographical territory 
of their country, as well as on how they viewed Russia in a global context. In this 
sense, one can safely argue that during this period of time, Russia's foreign policy 
was not characterized solely by pragmatism; on the contrary, the main focus was 
to establish a sense of self-awareness for the country and its citizens -  both on 
domestic and international levels.
At this point, Russia was not a nation-state, but the remnants of what had 
once been a great Eurasian empire. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union also 
generated feelings of confusion as to who the Russians were, and what the 
Russian state represented (Jackson 2003, 28). Russians continued to feel tied to 
the other republics through shared social, economic, cultural and political 
experiences which communism had been building upon for decades. Based on a 
2004 survey, over half (57 percent) of Russians responded that Russia's future lay 
with the Commonwealth of Independent States, with only 28 percent in favor of 
Western Europe (Rose 2004, 7). The regime's goal was to provide a vision o f 
shared values and beliefs in order to maintain unity within the empire, and 
between the center and the Soviet Republics. As Remington states, “communist
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ideology was a source of strength for the Soviet state so long as there was no 
serious challenge to it” (Remington 2008, 123). With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, this feeling disappeared and left a void in its place. From this point of 
view, many analysts and historians alike argue that, after the collapse of 
communism, Russian national identity became dualistic in the sense that on one 
hand, it sprung from its own ethnicity, and on the other, it was synonymous with a 
multinational state (Jackson 2003, 28). Russia's foreign policy was shaped after 
1991 along with the “Russian idea” itself, which is, how Russia saw herself, and 
what its direction was. Jackson holds that “the 'Russian idea' was not necessarily a 
rigid and prescribed state ideology but rather a looser set of values which would 
replace Marxism-Leninism and around which people could unite.” He maintains 
that “it was not a political doctrine instituted by the state, but a common vision for 
the nation based on the values its people shared” (Ibid 30).
To summarize the previous part, the 1990s were a period of time during 
which Russia struggled to rid itself of the communist legacy and attempt to define 
Russia's place in the newly forming world. For many scholars, this period can be 
characterized by the “de-ideologized” foreign policy of Russia, and by its 
pragmatic approach. In my view, one ideology had been abandoned in order to be 
replaced with another in the near future. In the case of Russia during Yeltsin's two 
mandates, liberal democracy, even though dysfunctional, could be regarded as a 
prevailing ideology. Nevertheless, there were many aspects for which liberal 
democracy in Russia was doomed to cease to exist: the conflicts in Chechnya 
which demonstrated separatist tendencies and a possible breakup of the Russian 
Federation; a loss of respect of Russia's status as a superpower in the world;
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economic decline alongside deteriorating living standards of its people; and last 
but not least, many Russians were dissatisfied with its foreign policy, under which 
the role of Russia was reduced to the United States' “junior partner.” Since 
Russia's foreign policy can only be as good as the country's domestic condition, 
the foreign policy could not be in better shape. “There was no consensus on what 
precisely constituted Russia's national security and other interests” (Sakwa 2004, 
361). Foreign policy thus, as Trenin and Lo (2005, 5) put it, became “a major 
battleground in the struggle for a new national identity between the 
traditionalist/conservative and innovative/liberal trends in Russian society.” The 
outcome of such a struggle was about to determine what Russia would mean to its 
neighbors and the rest of the world in the twenty first century.
3.2 Russia's Foreign Policy Conceptions in the 1990s
Scholarly literature on post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy has offered a 
number of perspectives o f the foreign policy's internal and international context. 
Five o f these have been deemed to be the most important (Lynch 2001, 8) in 
understanding post-communist foreign policy. Firstly, the Russian state faced a 
profound crisis of political and national identity after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. This crisis pushed Russia's foreign policy towards nationalism and 
unilateralism. Secondly, the Russian state was confronted with the disintegration 
of the classical nodes o f power which, in turn, generated catastrophic 
consequences such as economic depression, the dismemberment o f the armed 
forces as a coherent body, and a considerable external debt. Thirdly, the process 
of decision-making as far as foreign and security policy are concerned has
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frequently lacked coherence and structure mostly because of the number o f state 
agencies which have pursued personal interest ahead of the Russian state in both 
domestic and international policy. Fourthly, Russian diplomacy has frequently 
acted in an anti-Western manner which has not allowed Russia to become 
integrated within the G-7. Last but not least, there is an important consideration to 
be made as far as Russian foreign policy is concerned.
Since 1993, the Russian government has not always been able to act at the 
international level according to Russian national interest. In other words, national 
interest did not always supersede the specific interests o f the political and 
economic elites which controlled Russian politics during the Yeltsin era. Not only 
was there this particular discrepancy, but to be precise “it is no longer 
meaningful,” as Dmitri Trenin put it, “to speak of a single, universalist national 
interest or even permanent national interests, but rather to recognize that there 
exist multiple conceptions of the national good” (Trenin and Lo 2005, 8). The 
2000 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation which replaced the 
Concept adopted in December 1997 talks about the national interest of Russia as 
of “a combination of balanced interests of the individual, society and the state in 
the economic, domestic, political, social, international, information, military, 
border, ecological and other spheres.” These interests, as it states in the 2000 
National Security Concept, “are long-term and determine the basic goals, strategic 
and current tasks o f the domestic and foreign policy of the country. The national 
interest of Russia in the international sphere boil down to ensuring the sovereignty 
and reinforcing the position of Russia as a great power and one of the influential 
centers of the multi-polar world, developing equitable and mutually beneficial
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relations with all countries and integration associations, above all the countries 
members of the Commonwealth o f Independent States and Russia's traditional 
partners, all-round respect for human rights and freedoms and inadmissibility of 
double standards in this sphere. The implementation of the national interests of 
Russia is possible only on the basis of stable economic development. This is why 
the national interests o f Russia in this sphere are key interests to all the others” 
(Rossiiskaya Gazeta 2000). This comprehensive citation from the National 
Security Concept brings me directly to the list of foreign policy concepts which 
are going to be explained next.
When discussing the topic of foreign policy immediately after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, three major orientations of the political elite have emerged and 
framed their conceptions of Russian foreign policy. These three sets of ideas 
guided foreign policy issues in the years to come, and directly influenced policies 
regarding “Near Abroad,” as well the conflicts in these regions. The foreign 
policy concepts in question are: the liberal westemists, the fundamentalist 
nationalists, and the pragmatic nationalists, with the nationalists and communists 
following fundamentalist nationalist views, the centrists supporting pragmatic 
nationalist views and the reformist or liberal democrats adhering to the liberal 
westemist views (Jackson 2003, 50). Nonetheless, by the year 1993, pragmatic 
nationalist ideas were becoming dominant and the rhetoric of Russian foreign 
policy was moving in a centrist direction.
Let me briefly look at each set of ideas. Liberal westemists believed that 
foreign policy should be founded upon the idea that Russian identity was, in fact, 
synonymous to a civic state within the borders of the Russian Federation. Their
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ideas looked solely towards the future. Liberal westemists argued that the Soviet 
past could not help Russia in its attempt to formulate policies, and that the only 
way this could be achieved was to sever all ties with the Soviet Union. In 
addition, they believed that Russia could benefit from liberal democracy, market 
reforms, and a completely new direction in its relations with the West. These 
views were echoed in how they formulated Russia's position in relation to the near 
abroad states. Liberal westemists argued in favor o f non-interference in other 
states’ internal affairs, as well as the principle of equality o f states. According to 
them, Russia's core interests lie in the West, and the only threat the country could 
face was from communist totalitarianism. However, their ideas turned out to be 
“somewhat unrealistic” (Jackson 2003, 34). The introduction of a market 
economy, protection of human rights, cooperation at international levels, and the 
belief that Russian and Western interests could coincide, did not become true in 
the end, and, if  so, only in a limited extent based on pragmatism rather than on 
sharing or believing these values.
As opposed to liberal westemists, fundamentalist nationalists, including 
communists, argued that Russia could not be defined from an ethnic perspective. 
In other words, the boundaries o f the new country were considered to expand 
beyond the Russian Federation, or on the contrary, to be limited to the areas 
inhabited by ethnic Russians in Russia. Also, contrary to liberal westemists, they 
believed that Russia's past could not and should not be erased, and that Russian 
foreign policy was to be built on the premise that the collapse of communism was 
a negative event for which Western countries were responsible. This, of course, 
made ideals of cooperation with the West virtually impossible. In fact, according
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to the fundamentalist nationalists’ world vision, Russia was threatened by enemies 
which determined the loss of its status as a great power. At the core of their ideas 
were domestic policies which were essentially anti-democratic and which opposed 
market economics and capitalism as such. At the same time, they opposed a future 
marked by a complete detachment from the Soviet Union and the communist past.
They yearned for an assertive foreign policy which would, o f course, 
center on the ideal of recreating Great Russia, and not on trying to integrate it in 
an international context. There were variations as to how Russia could regain its 
importance and prestige; some argued that the imperial Soviet Union needed to be 
restored, whereas others believed that they could recreate a unitary Russian state 
following the model of the Czarist Empire. They longed for strong leadership in 
the vein of Stalin. However, both perspectives had one thing in common: they 
were based upon the territory o f the former Soviet Union as they have never 
recognized the dismemberment o f the Soviet Union.
The third stream of ideology -  pragmatic nationalism -  borrowed, to some 
extent, a number of provisions from the aforementioned ideological tendencies: 
the liberal westemist and the fundamental nationalist. Pragmatic nationalists 
stressed the negative aspects of the breakup of the Soviet Union for which the 
West was to be blamed. They shared this attitude with the fundamentalist 
nationalists. On the other hand, as with the liberal westemists, they could see 
some benefits emanating from liberal democracy, e.g. market economy, as the 
economic growth was essential for achieving the country's objectives. Their 
definition of Russian national identity, which they also strove to find, had to 
satisfy the attributes of Russia which is, above all, defined linguistically. Thus,
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they claimed that the millions o f Russian-speaking people living abroad must be 
protected.
As far as the direction in foreign policy is concerned, pragmatic 
nationalists wanted Russia to restore its prestige, and become a great power. 
According to them, Russia's interests were placed between the East and West. 
However, Vladimir Putin's accession to the Presidency of Russia in December 
1999 meant that the entire “conceptualization of both East and West began to be 
rethought” (Gorodetsky 2003, 175). Although former Foreign Minister and then 
Prime Minister Primakov imprinted a deeply pragmatic character to Russia's 
foreign policy between 1996 and 1999, it was not until Putin’s first mandate that a 
new type of political realism emerged in Russia. Under President Putin, the ruling 
elites began “to make a concerted effort to articulate a new post-communist 
ideology for the Russian state” (Remington 2008, 119). Putin was aware of the 
fact that without having an ideology which would provide a new shared vision of 
Russia's future it would have been difficult to unite the masses of the frustrated 
average Russians. Clearly defining a new ideology would work as an instrument 
of rule, so Putin drew on the sentiments o f the millions o f Russians, who regretted 
the breakup o f the Soviet Union, especially the loss of Ukraine and Belarus 
without which “Russia appeared to lose part of its soul” (Sakwa 2004, 263), as 
well as on the frustration from the political elite from having failed to defend 
Russia's status as a great power. Putin therefore needed something which would 
unite and give meaning to the existence of the Russian Federation and which 
would drag out its inhabitants from a deep crisis of identity which they felt so 
strongly. Putin, however, found himself in a situation where he had to face up to.
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from my point o f view, the most challenging task: the need to maintain good 
relations with the West (the West used to be regarded as a state's enemy alongside 
with capitalism, globalism etc.) since he sought to promote Russia's economic 
interests abroad. On the other hand, there was a demand for inventing new 
enemies for the country. Since Russia has not faced any direct threat of war in the 
international environment since the defeat of communism, Putin had to change 
tactics in mobilizing the masses to support his politics. Furthermore, this would 
have had other effects on the global political scene. Firstly, he would have 
developed an image o f a smooth, trustworthy guy acting upon good intentions 
(while keeping the truths “in the closet”). Secondly, such a positive image of the 
leader of a great country in terms of size and nuclear capability would definitely 
shed better light on the whole country and its standing on the international scene 
both economically and politically. From another perspective, Putin's politics 
aimed to attain a double-barreled effect: inside its society and in global politics. 
The former would assure a confident feeling for Russians about the strength of 
their state, united and sharing one vision of the country's future, and the latter 
being treated as a first-rank power with a great deal of respect on the international 
scene. Nevertheless, the deadly 9/11 attacks came out of blue and twisted global 
politics around. Putin's aforementioned objectives appeared to be much more 
easily accomplished if he had made the right choice.
The aforementioned challenges faced by President Putin can be included in 
a joint effort to define Russia's national identity as a foundation-stone to be able to 
pursue his policies. This is going to be discussed next in more detail.
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3.3 Russian National Identity
Before pondering the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations during Putin's 
first and the second presidential mandates, it would be desirable to conclude this 
chapter with an attempt to provide a definition o f Russian national identity. The 
question of Russian national identity with regard to Putin's foreign policy is rather 
significant since, as Lo observed, one of the “features of Putin's management of 
foreign policy is that he tailors conceptions of Russian identity to circumstances 
and objectives” (Lo 2003, 128).
In the years following the collapse o f the Soviet Union, Russia found itself 
in a situation where it had to ask itself: “Where is Russia located -  in Europe, 
Asia or Eurasia?”, “Where was it going?”, “What was Russia's place in 
international politics?” etc. (Jakniunaite 2007, 147). It is necessary for the 
transforming country to be able to formulate and articulate answers to these 
questions. Berger and Luckman (1966) explain why: “The clearly defined state 
identity gives the meaning to the state.” It not only helps to provide answers about 
the state but it also tells others what the state is and what they could expect from it 
(Jakniunaite 2007, 149). In fact, the aim of the struggle to define state identity was 
based on a new ideology of Russia's foreign policy and on an attempt to formulate 
a concrete national interest. In her study on Russia's search for identity, Dovile 
Jakniunaite (Transformation o f  Putin's Regime 2007) seeks to analyze the 
complexity of Russian identity during the first six years o f the presidency of 
Vladimir Putin. If we want to understand the identity questions of a particular 
country, we can draw on Jakniunaite's study who talks about the main “concepts 
from which the identity discourses are constructed” (Jakniunaite 2007, 149-150).
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It should be also mentioned here, that Jakniunaite makes a distinction between the 
identity of the Russian state and the Russian nation. While this distinction would 
not be important in the typical European nation-states, the case of Russia, 
according to Jakniunaite, deserves this. Nevertheless, for the purpose of my thesis 
I will presume that the creation o f a state's identity creates its national identity. 
This would be based on the fact that the meanings o f both identity dimensions are 
overlapping or they may even converge.
As for the Russian state identity, its political and geopolitical dimensions 
(about Russia's place and role in the world, the strategies how to change it, and the 
standing o f the state in the global politics), not to mention the cultural dimension 
(to define the main characteristic of being Russian), Jakniunaite outlines four most 
important meanings through which “various Russian political identity variants are 
coined” (Ibid 151, 158). These four categories are: uniqueness, Europe, Eurasia 
and a great power. The construction of these meanings would determine a 
particular project of Russian political identity. Putin's administration took 
advantage of these meanings in particular and used them creatively according to 
opinion polls, or to be more precise, according to the supremacy of any of these 
four meanings in society.
Uniqueness represented “a spiritual mission to bring enlightenment to 
neighboring peoples and the world...”, if I were to borrow a quotation by Sakwa 
of Russia's messianic mission (Sakwa 2004, 362), from which rose the concept of 
Russia's unique global role to be the “balancer” between East and West 
(Jakniunaite 2007, 152).
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Westemisers and Slavophiles in the earlier times led a debate on Russia's 
relations with “Europe,” representing the second category o f meanings, where the 
identity would be defined through the difference. While the followers of the 
former were in favor of Russia's integration into Western institutions, the latter 
stressed specific Russian values claiming that establishing closer ties with Europe 
would mean threatening their traditional values and their subsequent loss. It has 
been argued that the basic structure of this meaning has not changed since the 
nineteenth century. The East still represents a world which is patriarchal or 
undeveloped, whereas the West (in its positive meaning) constitutes a modem and 
civilized world (Ibid 152-157).
The third category -  Eurasia -  supported the ideal of “belonging to no one 
and yet to everyone” (Lo 2002, 18). Followers of this ideal distanced themselves 
from Europe, denied integration into Europe, while promoting foreign policy 
oriented towards the post-Soviet countries.
The last category -  great power -  represented a debate how to exercise this 
role since there was no doubt whatsoever that Russia is a great power, whether it 
was better to be a balancing power, a self-sufficient power, or a power preferring 
cooperation or confrontation (Jakniunaite 2007, 158).
3.4 Putin's “Third Way”
On rising to power, Putin set his own “third way” or “new realism” in his 
aim to reassert Russia's status as a great power, to promote its international 
integration and to improve the country's image. As a representative of the 
national-patriots (centrist view), he opposed Russia's political integration into
47
Explaining Russia's Foreign Policy Tow ards the United States Under V ladim ir Putin
Europe or the “Americanization” of its foreign policy (e.i. accepting American 
values and interests as to be universal), preferring to join international institutions 
on Russia’s terms, reflecting his desire for equal status with the most powerful 
members while retaining Russia's native traditions and sovereignty. Putin, being 
against any Western model of democracy, instead insisted on creating his own 
model. He also acknowledged that there was a need to cooperate with the West so 
he distanced himself from the concept of Russia as defined by its ideological 
confrontation with the Western world.
Putin appeared to be the sole decision-maker on all important matters as 
far as foreign policy was concerned. He used his proficient rhetoric masterfully, 
adapting his speeches to his audiences and intended targets. In other words, when 
speaking with the representatives of Europe, he would stress the European identity 
of Russia, with Chinese leaders he would play up Russia's Eurasian identity, in the 
case o f CIS leaders he would play a different card, such as common history, and 
when talking to the millions of his brethren Russians he would emphasize Russia's 
uniqueness and its status of a great power. Most importantly, Putin understood 
“his” Russia masterfully as well as he understood that Russia had its national 
interest, albeit an always evolving one, and could not be regarded as if there was 
only one single interest. Putin's strength was that he knew how to use all available 
instruments in order to pursue his goals on both the domestic and international 
scene.
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3.5 The Role of Presidents
One must not exclude the role of heads of states as key actors in 
international relations. In both countries, be it in the United States or in Russia, 
presidential successes or failures are regarded as the country's successes or 
failures. In the American system with its separation of powers, foreign policy is 
the area where presidents can enjoy the greatest freedom of action (Brzezinski 
2007, 8).
A similar position o f president had been also secured in the Russian 
Federation by the 1993 Constitution under the rule of President Boris Yeltsin. 
Although the aim of the president at that time was totally different and the 
president’s discretion was more or less applied on securing his own personal 
interests, under Putin's presidency this privilege was used to the fullest and even 
further extended.
President George W. Bush entered the White House Oval Office on 
January 20, 2001, as the successor of Bill Clinton. Upon his inauguration, Bush 
had a relatively good relationship with the President of the Russian Federation, 
Vladimir Putin. According to many diplomats, both presidents had been 
predestined to understand each other well since they had enjoyed a similar image 
of “harsh sorts of fellows from the masses.”
Under Bush, the U.S. foreign policy was significantly put aside for more 
than half a year before being spurred into action by the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. There have been some critical voices expressing the opinion 
that the opportunity, which emerged in the wake of these terrorist attacks, to
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enforce a global coalition by Washington had been missed out. Bush has been 
blamed for not seeing the world rally around America and for acting in a 
unilateral way when calling for a War on Terror. Despite the country's capacity to 
shape global realities by mobilization and inspiration of many other international 
players, these capabilities have been significantly declining due to its moral 
standing and rising global hostility towards the United States (Brzezinski as a 
leading critic of Bush's War on Terror in his book The Choice: Global 
Domination or Global Leadership 2004 talks about the U.S. international role in 
the twenty first century).
Nevertheless, some actors on the global stage welcomed this new rising 
hostility towards America. They saw it as a breeding ground for the enforcement 
of their own interests as well as for depriving America from its imaginary global 
throne.
In 2001, the relations between Russia and the United States could be 
defined as a “strategic partnership” (Kuchins and Trenin 2004, 1). However this 
partnership had not lasted very long and major policy differences began to emerge 
over the U.S. invasion to Iraq in 2002-2003, the 2004 Orange Revolution in the 
Ukraine, or the U.S. missile defense to name a few. The period following 2003- 
2004, has been described by many as a “crisis,” with evident signals of the re- 
emerging threat of a new Cold War.
3.6 President Bush's Foreign Policy from Moscow's Perspective
The global politics, up until the beginning of the twenty-first century, had 
been the outcome of the defeat of communism. The end of the Cold War
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established the United States as the winner, which would dominate the world in 
the years to come and the Soviet Union as the defeated side which was restrained 
from undermining the winner's position. Since then, the United States has been 
deeply engaged in partnership coalitions promoting peace and security not only in 
Europe, but also in the regions of Asia. America's aim has been to spread 
democratic values and to support European integration and coooperation with 
Russia within the new global order. U.S.-Russian relations were no longer 
dominating international politics. While America has been concentrating on its 
ties with the entire world, Russia's business has been mainly Eurasian due to the 
fact that the country had to face some major domestic challenges, mainly in 
economic reconstruction allowing Russia's integration into the global community.
As mentioned earlier, foreign policy of President Bush during the mid-OOs 
did not include Russia among its top priorities. His foreign policy team centered 
on stabilizing Iraq, promoting War on Terror, dealing with China's increasing 
power, possible challenging threats posed by rogue states such as Iran and North 
Korea, and trying to mend relations with Europe. What Bush was attempting to 
achieve was a diversion of public attention from the fact that the United States did 
not have a functioning foreign policy as far as Russia was concerned. Instead, the 
Bush administration tried to replace an effective foreign policy with what 
appeared to be a personal friendship between the two presidents. Of course, this 
strategy could not work indefinitely, especially since Russia was drifting towards 
more autocratic leadership, and it became more and more obvious that a possible 
anti-Western foreign policy in Moscow could create serious problems for the 
United States. By the time the first Putin presidency had ended, Moscow was
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primarily focused on creating propaganda and applying media pressure on elites 
in Europe and the United States alike. Serious attempts o f constructively engaging 
the United States were considered as being condemned to failure. Public Relations 
campaigns and propaganda ensured the exact opposite: relations between Russia 
and the world's leading power were not to ameliorate.
American foreign policy has ever since been seen by the Kremlin as a 
problem for the Russian Federation as well as a menace to worldwide security, 
while American military policies have never ceased to be considered as 
fundamentally anti-Russian. Publicly, military figures in Russia identified the 
United States as the enemy from whom Russia needed to protect itself, both 
politically and militarily, as back in the Soviet times. This message was spread 
throughout Russia as a means of obtaining support for the Kremlin, but also 
across its borders, proving to Washington that Moscow's security issues are to be 
taken seriously. Nevertheless, Moscow could not afford to overlook the 
consequences its offensive position might generate if Russia were to engage in an 
arms race.
Thomas Remington, in Politics in Russia, described the fear o f many 
policymakers or scholars throughout the world, when speaking about the 
possibility of “a new Cold War,” as Russia has been seeking to “balance herself 
against the West rather than to integrate itself into it” (Remington 2008, 11). The 
reason behind this concern lies in the system of government established in Russia 
under Putin -  authoritarianism -  which can “very likely herald a return to a 
climate of international tension, a new division o f Europe, and a new arms race” 
(Ibid 12).
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Dmitri Trenin holds in this respect that “U.S.-Russian tensions and rivalry 
in the CIS are inevitable,” but “if the United States comes to believe that Russia 
has launched an imperial comeback, a second round of the Cold War could be all 
but inevitable” (Trenin 2004, 103). But as long as the United States remains 
preoccupied with its restructuring the greater Middle East and fighting in 
Afghanistan in order to defeat international terrorism and prevent the proliferation 
of weapons o f mass destruction, it is unlikely that Washington would aim at 
spiraling U.S.-Russian relations into such a crisis which could lead to a new Cold 
War.
Kuchins also provides us with answers to the question of why a new Cold 
War, although many times predicted, has never happened: Firstly, “Russia did not 
have any good policy option but to accept U.S. behavior despite their different 
views.” This explanation is based on the balance of power. Secondly, from the 
liberal point o f view, “Russia has been undergoing a transition into a market 
democracy, and shares more common values and interests with the United States 
and the West” than it has ever before (Kuchins and Trenin 2004, 92-93).
Because of the fact that it is in Russia's interest to neither be led into 
isolation, nor into the United States' interest to employ a policy of containment 
regarding Russia, the threat o f the new Cold War is unlikely. However, increasing 
Russian power, an authoritarian regime and more aggressive behavior coming 
from the Kremlin may prevent any closer alliance based on shared values between 
the United States, the West as a whole and Russia. The relationship will rather 
remain more tenuous and pragmatic based on future cooperation in the fields of 
security and energy.
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4. Russian Foreign Policy: 2000-2004
4.1 Putin's First Years in Office
The United States, as the leader of the coalition of Western countries long 
looked upon Russia with “a good bit o f naivete and unwillingness to be rational” 
(Bugajski 2002, 188). President Yeltsin was welcomed by the West in his role as a 
zealous defender o f democracy in the Russian Federation throughout his 
presidency (1991-1999). Despite having dissolved a legitimate parliament and 
having launched an attack on the Chechen nation living within the borders of 
Russian Federation, Yeltsin was accepted by his Washington counterpart as an 
equal and reliable partner. The case of President Putin offered quite a similar 
scenario yet he exchanged Yeltsin's fragile democratic regime for an authoritarian 
one. It was Putin who took the lead and returned Russia to the path o f war in 
Chechnya. And it was the same man who backed the return of the Federal 
Security Service (FSB), who curtailed freedom of the media, and who was willing 
to use armed federal forces not only within the newly defined Russian borders but 
also outside them (in 2008 the Russian military under orders from Putin and 
Medvedev were for months preparing for military intervention in Georgia).
Putin's leadership aimed at rebuilding the capacity of the state by the 
centralization of political power. He therefore needed to reduce the spheres of 
autonomy for a civic society, regional governments, and market institutions. Since 
Vladimir Putin ascended to the presidency, there has been a dramatic growth in 
the state's control over the major energy industries. What had helped him to
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achieve this was the high price of oil and gas in the world markets. Also, he did 
much to weaken already fragile democratic institutions and put forth political 
reforms which were about to serve as consolidation of his political power (McFaul 
in Kuchins 2004, 46).
Putin, during the first stage of his presidency, abandoned “the Yeltsin way 
o f governing built on an elected monarchy, and began moving toward a 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime.” Shevtsova defined the Russian system of 
governing popularized in Russia for centuries, having only been legitimized in a 
democratic way under Putin's rule as follows: “power identified with a particular 
person and government unaccountable to society” (Shevtsova in Kuchins 2004, 
40). Power in Russia has become personalized beyond the public's control with 
weakened democratic oversight over both domestic and foreign policies.
A well functioning presidential relationship between the two countries, 
especially of such importance on the global scene, is a key asset in any decision­
making process, and an asset which has the power to push the relationship 
forward. In the case of the United States and the Russian Federation, in addition to 
the presidents, the United States National Security Council and the Russian 
Federation's Security Council form another important channel between these two 
countries.
The two Presidents, George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin, had been 
drawn closely together, especially in the wake o f September 11, 2001. Their 
relationship is often spoken as one o f “strong personal chemistry” and as o f a 
“honeymoon” of the United States and the Russian Federation thanks to the 
achievements of the “most extensive level of cooperation since World War II,”
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when they got together for the sake of defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 
fall of 2001 (Kuchins and Trenin 2004, 91). However, this honeymoon did not last 
for long. Not only was their rapprochement based on the intentions of two leaders 
that differed fundamentally, but also as a relationship which did not have any firm 
foundation, and one lacking shared values. Furthermore, according to Jankauskas, 
in both countries, the presidents aimed at “expanding the realms o f their power 
covering themselves under the necessity to defend their state interests and 
effectively fight against the thought-to-be external enemies,” in the case o f Putin: 
against the “powers that aim to weaken Russia and infringe on its territorial 
integrity” (Jankauskas 2007, 62).
4.2 Russia's Concept of “the West”
Following the end of the Cold War the United States should have realized 
the fundamental ideological and cultural discrepancy between itself and the 
Russian Federation. Russia was, and still is, undergoing another period of 
modernization. Notably, during Yeltsin's presidency, the country was inspired to 
adopt a central Western model of institutions, values, habits, and attitudes. 
Nevertheless, this Western goal turned out to be too ambitious for post-Soviet 
Russia, especially during Putin's era. Despite the fact that the institutions are 
identical with those in the core countries (the West), the way how they work 
differs fundamentally. This also provides us with one of many explanations o f the 
dissimilarity in social, political, and economic life in Russia and in the core 
countries.
56
Pavla Korandová
Some authors argue that “the popular geopolitical image o f the West in 
Russia has multiple dimensions: it is an organic part of national identity, of 
individual and group perceptions, values and political ideologies” (O'Loughlin et 
al 2004, 5). In order to acquire a more profound understanding o f the opposition 
between East and West, it is also relevant to see how Russia regards Western 
countries; in other words, to assess Russia's image of the West. Political scientists 
(Diligensky and Chugrov 2000) distinguish two elements that form this image as 
the most important in determining Russia's view of the West. The first is the 
quotidian image that ordinary Russians have o f the West as a community o f states 
separate from Russia in international affairs. These delimitations, often based on 
negative criteria, are mostly accounted for by Russians' frustration of having lost 
their prestige and power in international politics when the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Furthermore, the West is always associated with the United States, which 
generates a fear that America may meddle in Russian domestic affairs thanks to 
its superpower status.
The second image of the West is as a distinctive socio-economic model. 
This image is characterized by stability and reflects Russia's domestic goals. This 
is also a double-edge sword because most Russians admire the welfare, 
technological advances and social achievements of the West. This, in turn, is a 
tool that the Russian government uses to persuade Russian citizens o f Russia's 
capability to advance and become equal to Western countries in terms of 
economic development. However, there is also the other side of the coin which 
must be considered at this point: The sense that by attempting to persuade Russian 
citizens of this capability, they are also made aware of the enormous gap that
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exists between Russia and the West in terms o f their socio-economic situation, 
thus making the Russians realize how difficult it would be to reach the same 
economic and social status.
These dissimilarities make true cooperation between Russia and Western 
countries, especially the United States, very difficult. Furthermore, never in the 
past has Russia been subordinate to any country, or has it been a colony o f any 
European country. Russia, on the contrary, controlled a significant part of Europe 
for many decades. It would therefore be naive to think that Russia would be 
willing to limit its relations with Europe, or that it would integrate into the 
European Union, or any international institution which would limit its decision­
making process, or would control its domestic policies.
Such an example would be accession into the World Trade Organization. 
The main objectives o f Yeltsin's presidency, as far as economics was concerned, 
was integration into such institutions where Russia would seek to increase its 
voice and could become a member o f the Western “Community of the strongest” 
economies. Upon Putin's accession into the presidential office, he made no 
revisionist approach. Nevertheless, as Russia's power was rising, Putin neglected 
the idea of joining these institutions as it would mean an invitation to “the others” 
to have control over his domestic policies. The idea that Russia live in a “common 
European home,” as part of a “Euro-Atlantic Community” and make efforts to 
rapidly integrate into European institutions, melted away in 2003, when Putin 
announced the idea o f further integration within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (aiming at creation of a common economic space for Russia, 
Ukraine, Belurus and Kazakhstan) based on the “positive experience of
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integration processes in the CIS,” and at the same time warning against any 
attempts at “hampering economic integration in the CIS” by special relations 
between the European Union and individual countries (the EU membership would 
be incompatible with the CIS common economic space). Subsequently, Putin 
shunted the idea of Russia joining the European Union to the “historic horizon” 
(Adomeit in Kuchins 2004, 115). Today, we can hardly believe that on March 5, 
2000, prior to his election, Putin spoke about the possibility of Russia joining 
NATO (on equal terms though) one day in the future (Sakwa 2002, 416).
4.3 What Prevented the West from Closer Cooperation with Putin's Russia?
There have been many factors contributing to the uneasy cooperation 
between Russia and the West including the United States. First of all, Putin 
showed a complete impassivity to human rights, most visibly in Chechnya. The 
conflict in Chechnya demonstrated how hopeless it would be for any further 
potential separatists tendencies to secede from the Russian Federation along 
ethnic lines. President Yeltsin and his new Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, 
responded to an Islamic militant insurgency in Daghestan in 1999 with the use of 
armed forces. Having led this victorious second war in Chechnya, Putin entered 
the presidential office. There had been many voices of criticism, emanating from 
the Council of Europe and the United States, of repression in Chechnya and 
widespread human rights abuses. However, this criticism soon eased up in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001. 
Since this event constituted a turning point in the Russian foreign policy, I will be 
returning to this incident at several later points in this treatise.
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A second factor contributing to an uneasy state o f affair between Russia 
and the West is Putin's control o f the media. Putin and his government launched a 
successful campaign against independent media outlets -  products of Yeltsin's 
liberal regime (Goldgeier and McFaul 2005, 50). Upon Putin's accession to power, 
there were only three television networks with a national reach covering politics 
nationwide. It was the NTV television station controlled by Vladimir Gusinsky; 
then Berezovsky's main television station ORT (with a 49 per cent stake), and 
RTR, which has always been a state-owned Russian television channel and 
therefore easily controlled by the government. Putin took control of ORT when 
the billionaire Boris Berezovsky was forced to sell his shares in ORT and go into 
exile in London. NTV was taken over by state-owned Gazprom -  with close links 
to government -  in 2001. Gusinsky not only lost the television channel, but also 
Segodnya (daily newspaper) and the weekly Itogi. Another powerful man and a 
member of Yeltsin's administration (responsible for a voucher privatization in 
Russia during the 1990s) was Anatoly Chubais, the head of the state-owned 
monopoly UES (United Energy Systems) until 2008. Chubais, despite avoiding 
harsh criticism of the president, was compelled to sell his small private television 
company, REN TV, to a more Kremlin-friendly owner in 2005.
McFaul also points out that the independence of electronic media was 
eroded on the regional level, when “heads of local state-owned television stations 
continued to follow political signals from regional executives, and most regional 
heads of administration stood firmly behind Putin in the last electoral cycle.” 
Although dozens o f newspaper and web portals have remained independent and
60
Pavla Korandová
offer a platform for political figures of all persuasions, none of these platiorms 
enjoys mass audiences (Idem).
More generally, Putin's presidency meant a persistent struggle for the 
preservation of media freedom which was accompanied by an atmosphere of fear. 
The methods Putin used in dealing with most of his critics included harassment by 
the tax authorities, imprisonment, loss of journalistic job, or even killings. The 
murder of Anna Politkovskaya, a famous Russian journalist of the daily Novaya 
Gazeta and a prominent human rights activist, known for her reporting from 
Chechnya, and of many others who tended to be critical of Putin's policy give rise 
to suspicions of the ruling elite’s participation in these crimes. There are no doubts 
that certain individuals had been put on Putin's list of participants who had 
conflicting interests with Mother Russia (oligarchs, independent media, foreign 
countries, Chechen rebels, etc.). In 2004, in its third annual worldwide press- 
freedom index the Reporters without Borders ranked Russia 140 out of 167 
countries assessed (Goldgeier and McFaul 2005, 48). This brings me to another 
question on the anti-oligarch campaign launched by President Putin. Not only did 
the level o f corruption not decrease during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, but 
also the number of suspicions murders of Kremlin opponents increased. Was the 
proclaimed campaign to fight corruption only an instrument to gain more room for 
Putin's maneuvers? Moreover, he got rid o f the oligarchs' influence ascending to 
power during Yeltsin's years only to be replaced with his own people minions 
affiliated with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).
A third crucial political change introduced by Putin's administration 
involved “regional reforms.” The breakup of the Soviet Union confronted both the
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federal center and members of the federation with a fundamentally new situation. 
Putin made governance in Russia's regional administrations and the strengthening 
o f central authority his top priority following the fact that some Russian regions 
were using their newly-gained freedom for the purpose of challenging the federal 
center. Immediately, after his accession to the presidential office in 2000, Putin's 
campaign began with reasserting Moscow's authority across the country by 
establishing seven supra-regional districts headed primarily by former generals 
and KGB (the predecessor o f the FSB) officers. These new super-governors were 
assigned the task o f taking control of all federal agencies in their jurisdictions, 
many of which had developed affinities, if not loyalties, to regional governments 
during the Yeltsin era. These seven representatives of federal executive authority 
also investigated governors and presidents of republics as a way of undermining 
their autonomy and threatening them into subjugation. Putin also emasculated the 
Federation Council, the upper house of Russia's parliament. The governors and 
heads o f regional legislatures were removed from this chamber and replaced with 
appointed representatives from the regional executive and legislative branches of 
government. Those regional leaders showing some resistance to Putin's authority 
had to face the consequences of elections being rigged against them. In September 
2004, Russian federalism was challenged once again when Putin announced his 
plan to appoint governors (as it turned out later, the majority of the newly 
appointed governors were the governors in place before). His move was justified 
as a means of making regional authorities more effective and liable to their acts 
(Idem). Also at the heart of this reform by Putin was the reformation o f the
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Russian army, which had lost its unifying role. With these measures, Putin aimed 
at preventing regional separatism and competing sovereignty claims.
A fourth important political change carried out by Putin was his 
considerable achievement in weakening parliament's autonomy in December 
2003. Until then, parliament had been regarded as an institution of Russia's 
democratic system. However, Putin took advantage of a majority of support 
following the successful 1999 election into the State Duma and made parliament 
more compliant with his aims. These aims, among others, included “acquiring 
control of other political resources, such as NTV and the backing o f governors to 
achieve a smashing electoral victory for the Kremlin party, United Russia, in the 
December 2003 parliamentary election. After these elections United Russia and 
its allies in the parliament were in a control of two-thirds o f the seats in 
parliament” (Idem). Nevertheless, the Kremlin's greatest asset was Putin's own 
constant popularity. The leaders of United Russia were receiving positive 
coverage on all -  now state-controlled -  national television stations as well as 
tremendous financial support from oligarchs. On the contrary, representatives of 
other Russian political forces were getting negative coverage in the media or had 
even been discriminated against and discredited. Also, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe issued a critical preliminary report on 
Russia's 1999 parliamentary election, which stressed that “the State Duma 
elections failed to meet many OSCE and Council o f Europe commitments for 
democratic elections” (OSCE 2003). The December 2003 State Duma Elections 
raised some real doubts on Russia's move towards the Western ideas of 
democracy. Not only because of the intimidation of journalists, but also because
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of the use o f the Kremlin's apparatus to advance its preferred political party. 
Russia thus proved to be a world away from being a consolidated democracy.
Fifth, Putin and his regime demonstrated complete indifference to property 
rights as well as the institutions that protect them when he put forth a break-up of 
the powerful oil company Yukos and redistributed its most important assets. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos's head, made this company the most dynamic of 
Russia's oil companies, and himself transformed into Russia's wealthiest citizen at 
the beginning of the twenty first century. Maybe it was Khodorkovsky's spending 
in the political arena or his fight for control o f Russia's most lucrative natural 
resources that challenged Putin. Ultimately Mikhail Khodorkovsky was jailed and 
his company bankrupted. Its most profitable asset, Yuganskneftegaz, was sold to a 
state-owned company friendly to the Putin regime, Rosneft. Igor Sechin, the 
chairman of the board in Rosneft, was also a chief aide to Putin. Andrei 
Illarionov, Putin's own economic advisor, called the sale of Yuganskneftegaz the 
“scam of the year” (Ostrovsky 2004; Goldgeier and McFaul 2005).
Finally, Putin also regarded the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
as a threat to his power (Goldgeier and McFaul 2005). Putin's administration 
implemented such measures in a newly enforced NGO law which essentially 
meant the liquidation o f many of these organizations. Such measures included 
obstructing registration and tax laws. The NGOs meeting these requirements yet 
remaining critical of the Kremlin would be forced to close by frequent check-ups 
and harassment by the Federal Registration Office which was given broad powers 
o f control over these organizations. During Putin's reign, many independent non­
governmental organizations were forced to exist on the margins o f society.
64
Pavla Korandová
Instead, the Kremlin aimed at creating generously sponsored state-controlled 
NGOs. In the 2004 Annual Address to the Federation Assembly on May 26, Putin 
argued that “not all of the organizations are oriented towards standing up for 
people's real interests. For some of them, the priority is to receive financing from 
influential foreign foundations” (Putin 2004). The State Duma with its pro-Putin 
majority had a free hand when tightening up the NGOs legislation when it 
included control over grants received from abroad. As Goldgeier concludes: “Nor 
are Western NGOs immune from Russian state harassment. Putin's government 
tossed out the Peace Corps, closed down the OSCE's office in Chechnya, declared 
persona non grata the AFL-CIO's (The American Federation o f Labor and 
Congress o f Industrial Organizations) field representative in Moscow, and raided 
the offices of the Soros Foundation” (Goldgeier and McFaul 2005, 45-53).
4.4 Putin's Foreign Policy in the Aftermaths of 9/11
Putin's first mandate as President of the Russian Federation started under 
the guise of pragmatism. Putin also used the strategy of pragmatism when it came 
to Russian foreign policy which fueled his image as a cool politician. Putin's 
vision of foreign policy represents the exact opposite of that shared by both 
Yeltsin and Gorbachev who dealt with foreign affairs emotionally and with a 
concern for ideology. Putin ignored these two components, and tackled the issue 
of foreign policy in a cool and collected manner as exemplified by the fact that 
Putin focused on “effectiveness and the efficient use of resources” (Fawn 2003, 
45). Putin learned valuable lessons from the decades preceding his mandates; 
consequently, his approach was “businesslike”: calculated and pragmatic. In fact,
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after September 11, 2001, that there was a significant increase in pragmatism as 
far as Russian foreign policy was concerned.
Putin's approach to international affairs greatly differed from that of 
Yeltsin. Putin's take on foreign policy had been described as Eurocentric; inclined 
towards globalism, therefore “Eastern”; confrontational, focused on domestic 
priorities, economic, and so on. However, many analysts (Gorodetsky and Cass 
2003, 14) have argued that the trait which best describes Putin's intentions 
regarding his foreign policy was the concept o f securitization of Russia's foreign 
policy. This, in turn, implies that political and military priorities are dominant to 
economic ones. Irrespective of the growing importance o f the economy, security 
concerns are still at the top of the Russian agenda with regard to external affairs.
As regards the profile of securitization, it is not an independent concept, 
rather the opposite. Putin's first year as President was the manifestation of the 
interplay between securitization and the “economization” of Russia's foreign 
policy. Moreover, securitization in Putin's Russia, as put by Gorodetsky and Cass, 
“is reflecting a increased role and influence o f the security apparatus in foreign 
policy -  both at the individual level and institutionally” (Ibid 29).
Putin's views on globalization are also noteworthy in the context o f U.S.- 
Russian international relations. Globalization can be defined as a set of economic 
processes which aim at promoting trade and mobilizing unused resources 
worldwide. However, Putin was able to grasp the fact that globalization has deep 
political reverberations which go from West to East. As regards the issue of 
power, Putin and Russia do not want to follow Western lead although they are
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willing to use the same language as Western countries in order to attain their 
goals. The war on terror is a good example (Schopflin 2006).
This thesis examines Russian foreign policy after September 11, 2001, 
because it was at this moment when Putin's pragmatism reached its peak. Also, 
both his active and passive responses surfaced as events took place in September 
2001 in the United States (Fawn 2003, 57). The dramatic change in the 
international climate did not leave Putin indifferent. From this perspective, his 
passive reactions may be more interesting in this context. Putin did not oppose 
powerful adverse developments such as the American military presence in Central 
Asia, as well as NATO's plans to expand into the Baltic States, an undesirable 
prospect as far as Russia was concerned. Putin's attitude and apparent acceptance 
of the situation was generated by his awareness that Russia could not help such 
developments. In a sense, Putin understood that unless you are in a position to 
protest against a certain state of affairs, it is better to accept it and minimize your 
losses. In fact, Putin demonstrated that he had learned from his predecessors 
unsuccessful campaigns of protest against NATO expansion, or Western military 
action in the Balkans. Furthermore, Putin was concerned with building a new
image for Russia at the international level.
Politicians and political analysts alike argue that Putin's international
relations strategy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
represented a significant departure in Russian foreign policy. Russia became 
active in the global war against terrorism; in fact, many Western politicians 
praised Putin's active response to the dramatic events of 2001. British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair was particularly pleased with Moscow's cooperation, and
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remarked that all hostility between Russia and the West had ended at that point. 
President George W. Bush also praised Putin’s foreign policy, and Russia's 
readiness to become part of the anti-terrorist coalition.
Putin's hopes for cooperation with the United States were seriously 
dampened when America only gave Russia a weeks' notice of the decision to 
withdraw unilaterally from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. Some 
statements, as found in Fawn (2003), suggest that Russia had viewed the treaty in 
question as a symbol of stability in strategic relations, with Putin repeatedly 
stating his openness to amend the treaty so that it permitted Bush to develop his 
National Missile Defense program. Despite continued Russian concerns, the 
Americans refused to change their plans so that the arms reduction treaty signed at 
the Moscow summit in May 2002 had little substantial importance (Idem, 54). For 
Putin, the substantive military issues mattered less that the political signals that 
these American moves conveyed. They scarcely reciprocated the kind of 
partnership attitudes Moscow had tried to exhibit in September.
There is a need to present a short overview of Putin's decisions which 
supported the war on terrorism. The first step that Moscow took towards 
cooperation with the West was to issue a declaration of solidarity with the 
Western world. Moreover, U.S.-Russian cooperation was reinforced in a joint 
statement on fighting terrorism which came after the October 2001 APEC Summit 
in Shanghai where Putin did not express any concerns regarding American 
military interventionist action. Russian solidarity with the United States 
manifested itself as a radicalization of President Putin’s stance on the fight against 
terrorism. In fact, Russia had repeatedly tried to establish a common front against
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terrorism at the international level in order to combat the terrorist threat it had to 
face in the North Caucasus and its allies in Central Asia. The 2000 National 
Security Concept o f the Russian Federation had met with much criticism from the 
United States for the proclaimed rights to use nuclear weapons “in case of a threat 
to the existence of the Russian Federation” (National Security Concept 2000). The 
events of September 11 were exactly what Putin needed to get this voice heard 
throughout the world, and to finally to be able to create a united force which could 
oppose terrorism.
However, what was truly astonishing was the extent of operational support 
that Russia put forth against the Taliban in Central Asia in the aftermath of 9/11. 
This operational support consisted of intelligence collaboration as well as aid in 
accessing military facilities in the region (Fawn 2003, 4). In fact, Moscow not 
only provided information to NATO; it did so with great efficiency. This 
generated another first when in February 2002 the head of Russian military 
intelligence was invited to Washington.
Support for the anti-Taliban campaign also came in the form of Russian 
aid to the Northern Alliance on which the United States depended as ground 
forces. Despite the fact that Moscow officially denied having servicemen in 
Afghanistan, reports estimated that around 2,000 Russian technicians and pilots 
were involved in the Northern Alliance operations in the region. As far as the 
financial value of the aid, it reportedly reached an estimated US$45 million (Fawn
2003, 176).
However, for Moscow's part, contributing such resources to the anti­
terrorist campaign did not necessarily serve the objectives pronounced by its
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American ally. Moscow recognized the advantages of using long-standing 
military and political links with NATO to further its own agenda (Idem). Initially, 
both Putin and Ivanov were cautious about any involvement of the CIS states in 
military action against Afghanistan. The September 24, 2001, Putin's presidential 
speech on active cooperation marked a turning point and was followed by far 
more helpful statements on specific facilities to be made available in the states 
bordering Afghanistan. Russian support in Central Asia came in two forms: active 
help and facilitating acquiescence. Active help was most clearly evident in the 
case of Tajikistan, the only Central Asian state which can be, as a result o f long- 
lasting civil war following the collapse of the Soviet Union, described as a failed 
state and de facto Russian protectorate. Moscow made available its air base near 
Dushanbe for retaliatory strikes against the Taliban and must have played a 
decisive part in persuading the Tajik government to overcome its initial reluctance 
to host forces of the United States (Ibid 178).
In the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Russia's part was more one of 
acquiescence to these states' cooperation with the Americans. Such acquiescence 
played a facilitative role. If the decisions to respond positively to Washington's 
requests for help were taken in Bishkek and Tashkent, a benevolent or at least 
neutral attitude on Moscow's part eased the way.
President Putin's attempt of rapprochement with the United States 
immediately after September 11, 2001 failed. Russia's status in the world 
substantially grew in power in the ten years that followed the 1998 financial crash. 
Not since the mid-1980s has the Kremlin enjoyed such a powerful position as it 
did in the mid-2000s. This was possible due to the favorable conditions in the
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world energy markets and the intelligent macroeconomic policy the Russian 
government put together. This position helped Russia reaffirm itself as a great 
international power, an autonomous center of power and control with highly 
ambitious leaders at present. Since then, both countries have become disillusioned 
with one another.
4.5 Final Remarks
The new international environment that emerged at the end of the Cold 
War has been more favorable to Russia and its strategic interests. Until September 
11, 2001, Russia's place in the world, however, had been uncertain with no 
significant influence on global affairs. The cause o f this was not only the 
economic decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union, war in Chechnya, 
the lack of authority shown in the Iraqi conflicts, but also by domestic issues. At 
that point, Putin had to judge matters carefully amidst a state of uncertainty and 
chaos; the presidential institution was the only center of stability and hope for 
millions of Russians.
Grumbling about the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and calling it 
catastrophic names proved effective. Putin, known for his strong dependency on 
public opinion, therefore laid out his political goal of righting the biggest 
“geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century” (term used by Vladimir Putin).
Putin's Russia was given new opportunities to define its new international 
role in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 
September 2001. The world's concerns about international terrorism could be
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rightly called as the breaking point when Putin commenced playing the new game 
in which Russia was determined to succeed. His effort to put forth Russia' long­
term objectives was eased significantly thanks to the worldwide increase in the 
price of oil which greatly strengthened Putin's hands.
At this crucial point, Putin bet everything on Western-centric foreign 
policy. He was aware that a good relationship with the West would serve as a 
strong instrument in the enforcement of Russian interests in Central Asia. He 
believed that Russia could become friend with both East and West: It may be a 
closer relationship with China acting on the invitation o f Russia to the community 
of Western States. Or it may be an instrument to counterbalance the unpredictable 
Muslim world and India. This “love-fest with the West” should have served as a 
convenient and powerful instrument in reasserting Russia's presence in the former 
Soviet states. Putin had no interest in competing with the United States at that 
moment. Instead he sought to become a regional “superpower.” Russia's 
weaknesses made it impossible to dominate the region during the 1990s. First of 
all, Russia had proved weaker than expected in terms of economic influence. 
Secondly, its military weaknesses were shown in the Chechen wars o f 1994 and 
1999 despite the fact that Russia's armed forces won the latter conflict. To this 
extent, Putin's decision to align Russia more closely with the West after 
September 11, 2001, cannot be considered a return to the Euratlantic approaches 
espoused by the then foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev.
Russia's previous attempts to convince the leaders of the Central Asian 
republics to allow new communities of states to be erected within the CIS under 
the guiding role o f Moscow in order to maximize Russia's economic, political and
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security positions had been unsuccessful. Ironically, as Martha Brill Olcott 
rightly observed, the “introduction of United States troops in Central Asia in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, also allowed the Russians to expand their 
influence in the region, as Moscow was now pressing for a balance of power” 
(Martha Brill Olcott in Kuchins 2004, 132).
The Bush's self-declared war on terror, however, did not bring Russia and 
the United States together as first hoped since the matters that separate these two 
countries-differences in values-have remained unchanged. Moreover, the war on 
terror divided Europe and launched a strong wave of global hostility towards 
America. Furthermore, Islamic extremists speaking out against the policies of the 
United States and “Western expansionism,” played up to Moscow's effort to 
secure its position at home as well as internationally.
Terrorism emanating from the North Caucasus has become a component of 
international terrorism, although their probable motivation has been to punish 
Moscow for its policies in Chechnya. The global war on terror has become a 
blessing for the Kremlin's policies seeking to weaken the West, particularly the 
United States, in order to secure its own stronger position. Firstly, Moscow's own 
security problems must be perceived by outsiders as being no different than those 
suffered by other countries; and on that account it has been seeking cooperation 
when dealing with them i.e. terrorism. Secondly, Moscow has distanced itself 
from common security threats and lets the West deal with their solving. Also, the 
Kremlin has tried to complicate any possible solutions whenever and wherever 
possible. While Washington committed itself to building up stable free market 
democracies, which it believed would be naturally attracted to the West, Moscow
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has been trying to maintain “managed instability and chaos” in the region in order 
to roll back any potential competitors' interests. Its policy has been similar to the 
one practiced in the time of the Soviet Union, one which has never been forgotten. 
This policy is based on a principle o f weakening its citizens with mutual disputes 
-  a “divide and rule” policy.
In contrast, Bush believed that an internal regime is linked with external 
behavior and put much effort into his democracy promotion agenda. He spoke 
about democracy promotion as “the urgent requirement of our nation's security,” 
while “the survival o f liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of 
liberty in other lands” (Fukuyama 2006, 47).
Although, the United States' presence in the region had been quite 
welcomed and supported by Moscow at the beginning, with its own increasing 
role in the region Moscow started to view any interference from the West in the 
region as an openly hostile act. Under Putin's regime, Moscow started to consider 
the CIS directly in its spheres of interest and has continued to exercise Russian 
influence in its neighborhood.
Russia's association with the new international security agenda established 
by Washington in the wake of September 11 had been suspended by the end o f 
Putin's first mandate. As Bobo Lo puts it, “despite the rhetoric about a ‘universal’ 
civilization with shared values and faced by common threats, the post-9/11 world 
is anything but united in its perceptions of threats values and international norms, 
in which even the notion o f a unitary West has become undermined...” (Bobo Lo 
in Kuchins 2004, 142).
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Many Putin's policies defined by the Kremlin as protection of all Russians 
in today's sovereign states around Russia's borders were, however, implemented 
with a view to serve Russia's national interests (i.e. primarily proving itself 
regionally and consequently, winning back its superpower status). This chapter 
introduced some of these measures. Chapter Five continues by investigating these 
policies that were set by President Putin during his first mandate and further 
extended after his re-election in 2004.
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5. Russian Foreign Policy: 2004-2008
5.1 Putin's Regime
On the threshold of his second term in the office, President Putin 
continued to expand the support base of his regime installed during his first term 
by “reformatting the balance of power at the highest echelons of the Russian 
government on his own term” (Ryabov in Kuchins 2004, 54). Putin expanded 
Russia's constituent territories, or regions, and further limited their powers. The 
President's power became independent from the elites at the same time as he was 
backing a strong “party of power” of which he became a sort of “moral 
authority.”
Enthusiasm about cooperation between Russia and America waned during 
each president's second mandate. Bush advanced America's three central foreign 
policy objectives -  the war on terrorism, the prevention of the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and promoting liberty all over the world. Russia 
made no significant contributions to any of these three goals as expressed by its 
American counterparts (Goldgeier and McFaul 2005).
Moreover, as Russia leaned towards autocracy and stabilized itself as a 
harsh authoritarian regime relying mainly on bureaucracy by Putin's second term, 
the West began to drift further and further away (Kuchins and Trenin 2004, 99). 
Russia's foreign policy regarding other post-Soviet states such as Georgia, 
Ukraine and Moldova has produced a breach between the West and the Russian 
Federation. The breach was also rhetorical, with President Putin openly accusing
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Western states o f meddling in the Ukraine Orange revolution, and supporting 
terrorists after the events in Beslan.
5.2 Russia's Policies Towards the Former Soviet States
Russia bet everything on economic ties in order to get the post-Soviet 
states into its sphere of influence. The Kremlin sought to gain their political 
loyalty by asserting their dependency on the Russian economy while relying 
heavily on personal relations with leaders of these countries. However, the 
resistance emanating from Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova can be perceived as 
anti-imperial sentiments. Nevertheless, Moscow accused the United States and 
Europe for this state of affairs on the basis of their “pressing” these states to adopt 
European or Western norms, accept assistance from international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank of International Monetary Fund and to 
become members o f the World Trade Organization.
Moscow has begun to use the most powerful instruments it possesses in 
order to discredit these countries in the West's view. Russia has taken advantage 
of its being the largest supplier of energy resources, as well as being the main 
business partner o f Europe. Russia has been striving to be perceived as a reliable 
business partner, and any failing to fulfill its business commitments should be 
deemed as somebody else's failure, in particular, those backed by the West. The 
aim is to discredit these countries in order to break the ties between the countries 
in the Russian sphere of interest and the West. It is in Moscow's interest to create 
an atmosphere of envy in which they could blame these “naughty countries” for 
any potential threat of shortage of energy supplies (namely Ukraine). This policy
77
Explaining Russia's Foreign Policy Tow ards the United States Under V ladim ir Putin
of deterrence and threats is quite similar to the one frequently used by the Soviet 
during the Cold War. Such policy would help Russia to establish a Soviet-like 
influence in the post-Soviet states. While under the Putin presidency this policy 
was put into practise only rhetorically (or not affecting any Western countries, e.g. 
during the 2005-2008 Russia-Ukraine gas disputes), the recent gas crisis in 
January 2009, which hit many European countries, can serve as the evidence of 
growing assertiveness o f Russia driven by its national interests.
Another example from the recent times represents a five-day armed attack 
by the Federal Russian forces on Georgia in August 2008, which suddenly ended 
with a victory o f the Kremlin. To be precise, Dmitri Medvedev, who succeeded 
Putin just a few months prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia, was already the 
President of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Putin's influence has not been 
diminished having remained in the Kremlin as Prime Minister.
The recent Russian victory in Georgia, however, can be perceived as a 
double victory: over Georgia as well as over the West, which had, until then, been 
seeking to draw the countries westwards from Russian borders and from the 
Kremlin's sphere of interest into the European Union's “Near Abroad”, and 
transform them into friendly, pro-Western democracies backed by NATO. I 
strongly believe that the war in Georgia represented the end of an era of world 
domination by the United States and its monopoly on decision-making process to 
use armed forces. The message coming from the Kremlin was quite clear: Russia 
considers events in the Caucasus and in other post-Soviet republics to be its own 
“private matters” (and thus exclusive of Russian foreign policies). By using armed 
forces, Russia demonstrated its power “rapidly rising under Putin” and its stance
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on outside interference towards its policies in a sphere of influence which it would 
not be willing to tolerate.
In this part, I argued that under Putin's presidency, the Kremlin's policies 
towards the former Soviet republics, in which economy (energy, in particular) 
played a pivotal role, have begun to be more coercive ones. The nature o f these 
policies can be found in Russia's concerns that the West could threaten Russia's 
national interests in the post-Soviet region.
5.3 Evolution of Russian-Western Relations after 2004
The strategic partnership that emerged in the wake of September 11, 2001, 
meant an opportunity for President Putin to realign Russia with the West and 
pursue his policies both at home and abroad. The Beslan tragedy on September 3,
2004, and Putin's rhetoric following this event, however, led to the deterioration 
of this partnership. Many Europeans and Americans have since been critical of 
Putin's policies over Chechnya and his grasp for more power as well.
Putin used the Beslan massacre to put forth his own policy aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of the state apparatus, namely o f the federal police, 
security and military agencies. In the aftermath of the Beslan tragedy, Putin 
pushed through a series of measures to strengthen national security and declared 
that the responsible terrorist group responsible for the Beslan tragedy -  organized 
by the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev -  is an enclave o f an international 
terrorist movement and could therefore represent a threat to the rest of the world 
(Remington 2008, 74).
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In April 2000 (following the launch of the second Chechen war), a new 
version of the Russian military doctrine was issued. This new version once again 
reaffirmed that “even a conventional attack on targets that, the Russians 
considered of existential importance could bring forth a nuclear counter-attack” 
(Rose Gettenmoeller in Kuchins 2004, 108). The Beslan tragedy launched another 
series of measures restricting civil and political liberties. The new legislation 
passed in response to the terrorist incidents assigned the FSB the responsibility to 
fight terrorism within the borders of the Russian Federation, and provided it with 
increased powers to command the Russian military forces in case o f an act of 
terrorism, to wiretap individuals suspended o f terrorist activity, and even to shoot 
down hijacked airplanes. Subsequently, the 2006 law then authorized the 
president to use both armed forces and Special Forces against terrorists outside the 
borders of Russia (Remington 2008, 237-238). Such or similar measures taken by 
the Kremlin would be then defined as “protection” o f millions of Russians in the 
today's sovereign states around Russia's borders.
Following the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, Putin encouraged 
Russians to form its own youth movements (e.g. “Nashi” meaning “Ours”) loyal 
to the Kremlin and devoted to patriotic and nationalist themes in order to prevent 
any breakout of a “color revolution” in Russia. These youth groups hold a 
military-style “summer camps” which can accommodate thousands (the one held 
in 2005 had over 3,000 young participants) o f enthusiasts more or less willing to 
obey their instructors' political commands. By using anti-Western nationalist 
rhetoric, these instructors warn that the West has been trying, as Claire Bigg 
reported on the Radio Free Europe, “to subvert Russia from without, while
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oligarchs, liberals, and other ‘fascist’ elements have been seeking to undermine if 
from within.” They urge these young people to be alert to threats emanating from 
both outer and inner forces, and not to hesitate to defend Russia by force. These 
groups are supported by Putin and aim to mobilize thousands of potential pro- 
Kremlin party electors to unite for the sake o f sharing common interests such as 
the fight against, in most cases, invisible external or internal enemies (Bigg, 
2005).
Apart from the aforementioned, Putin was able to unite Russian society by 
using counter-terrorism and by combating against a common enemy as an 
instrument to achieve this goal. Putin invariably used the same instrument as his 
counterpart in Washington; however, from my point of view, unlike Putin, 
President Bush truly believed in what he was saying, and believed that others 
would feel the same way. Despite using the same measures to justify their 
agendas, the background, as well as the goals of their approach, differed in 
principle. 1 believe that Bush's decision to go to war was based merely on 
dangerous threats which had become real, and. Bush's deep personal belief in 
democratic values which are to be promoted no matter how high the costs. It is 
difficult to make any judgments of the decisions made by the Bush administration 
in these days, nor is it the aim of this thesis; nevertheless, there is little doubts that 
Bush proved to be inadvertent as far as his allies in the war on terrorism are 
concerned. There has been much criticism of Bush's preemptive war doctrine and 
his unilateral decisions. While they may be perceived as missteps o f his 
administration, in the wake of the fact that there were no further deadly attacks or 
any potential threat similar in intensity to the events on 9/11 in the United States
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up to his departure from the presidential office, the Bush administration could be 
lauded as visionaries and judge itself to be redeemed. However, what I see as an 
irreversibly negative effect o f Bush's foreign policy is how he got his policy in the 
position he desired without the benefit of any obvious foresight. At that moment, 
he acted in an idealistic way without foreseeing the Russian allies' weaknesses and 
strengths, and primarily the contradictions in national interests and an absence of 
shared values. President Bush and his policy thus inadvertently worked well for 
President Putin's pragmatically set agenda. Paradoxically, in the aftermaths of 
9/11 with its war on terrorism, the United States has experienced how easy it can 
be to threaten the foundations of the international environment and in particular, 
damage its interests.
Despite disagreements over the war in Iraq in 2003, the strategic 
partnership between Russia and the United States was reconfirmed at the Putin- 
Bush Summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003. The aim of this summit was to 
expand cooperation between these two countries in all fields following the 
disputes over the United States led Iraqi war (The White House Government 
Archives June 2003). Nevertheless, the events after the Beslan tragedy put an end 
to any optimistic views o f long-continuing cooperation or even partnership 
between the United States and Russia.
5.4 Putin's Conception of “the East”
Foreign policy under Yeltsin, but even more so under Putin, was based on 
an attempt to rebuild the East. This concept must be understood from a rather
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complex perspective as it encompasses several nuances. The East represents the 
actual East, but it also represents an East which is neither congruent nor opposed 
to the West. The end of the Cold War was followed by the supremacy of the West. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was conducive to great unbalance in the world, 
with a strong triumphant West, and an East which was feeling less and less 
important, with countries such as Russia and China engaging in discussions as to 
the creation of a multi-polar world.
The East, as it emerged from Putin's foreign policy, presented itself as 
having a distinct value system that in fact, did not oppose nor contradict the 
universal principles of human rights, nor those of democracy, but actually offered 
a chance to make these principles truly universal (Fawn 2003, 177). For my part, 
Putin's opposition to Western standards of democracy or his approach to human 
rights indicated rather the opposite stance. The tension between universalism and 
particularism has been apparent throughout Russia's often disastrous engagement 
with modernity and modernization, and the post-communist experience was only 
the latest state in this ambivalent relationship between Russia, with its traditions, 
and the West, with its modernity. From this perspective, Russia appears to have 
regressed into a nation with a “Third-World” approach towards human rights. 
Associated with this approach is Russia's implicit adoption of an “Asian values” 
agenda, where democracy and human rights are subordinated to developmental 
tasks and where priority is granted to order and discipline rather than to individual 
liberty (Idem).
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5.5 Potential Cooperation between Russia and the United States
Russia's eternal efforts and hunger to become a superpower or at least to 
attain some characteristics of superpower status are real threats to its relationship 
with the West, which may end up in direct confrontation with each other. Since 
the president of the Russian Federation is the main, and occasionally, the only 
decision-maker surrounded by a small number of advisers, this may lead to an 
impetuous reaction based on an internal opinion, or, on some ideological grounds. 
Moscow's concept of a multi-polar world advanced Russia's cooperation with 
some of rogue states in the sphere of technological advancement, information 
exchange and also in arms sales to these problematic states (Iran for example). 
Through strengthening such cooperation, Russia aims at tipping the balance of 
power in a multi-polar world against advanced countries such as the United States 
and its North-Atlantic allies.
It would not be correct to blame Western countries, including the United 
States, for abandoning Russia in its transformation process, for not investing in 
the country enough, or for treating Russia unfairly in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, on many occasions, these Western 
contributions have been devalued by Kremlin policies. However, it has been a 
common practice of the Russian political elite to seek out cooperation which 
would change into a one-sided contribution for the sake of achieving some 
specific goals.
Cooperation between Russia and the West is very profitable to the former 
from an economic point of view. On the other hand, from a Western perspective,
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their potential profit would be only marginal. Trade between the United States and 
the Russian Federation has never been essential to the American economy 
(Bugajski 2002, 196). Moreover, economic trade with Russia carries with it 
important risks springing from the state of Russian domestic affairs along with 
faulty policies on the part o f Russian legislators. These are real and valid threats 
to the economies o f advanced countries, including the United States.
The relationship between Russia and the United States as well as other 
Western countries is exactly the opposite. None of the Western countries pose any 
kind of direct threat to Russia. Of course, there is the implicit threat of Russia not 
being able to advance along with the West, and ultimately being left behind and 
isolated. Nonetheless, this could happen in the absence of any bad will on the part 
of Western states as they might be generated by Russia's inability to increase its 
rate o f economic growth and development to match those of the West. Moreover, 
Russia is aware that unless it benefits from Western help, it cannot catch up with 
the advanced countries.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited some 
problems which required special commitments whilst solving them. There are 
about forty-thousand tons o f chemical weapons still in stock -  the world's largest 
declared chemical weapons stockpile -  which Russia is committed to getting rid 
of by a certain time. Nevertheless, Moscow has proved to be an unreliable player 
on the international scene, when it failed to meet its commitments in the area o f 
chemical disarmament. Russia has not met any of its commitments regarding this 
problem since 2000, the first deadline for meeting some of these obligations under 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. Consequently, it has asked for the final
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deadline to be moved from 2009 to 2012. In the area of chemical weapons as well, 
the problems related to lack o f funds mix with the consequences of 
mismanagement (GAO, 2004). This particular case should, however, be seen from 
a broader perspective. Russia's stronger position in a globalized world and its 
financial independence from Western institutions means that the West has lost 
some of the key instruments in the enforcement of its interests.
Russia's stronger position has been considered a relevant cause of its 
already frosty political relations with the United States and several other Western 
countries becoming even colder. Russia's only hopes have been tied to its 
economic partners who only seek personal gain. Russia considers these to be more 
important partners than the particular countries' governments. And the Russian 
policymakers are well aware of the fact that today's globalized world is 
predominantly run by the economic interests which serve above all other national 
interests.
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6. Conclusion
The birth of an independent Russian Federation in 1991 took place amidst 
the ruins of the Soviet Union, and has forced Russia and its political elites to come 
up with a new form of statehood as well as a way to formulate Russia's national 
identity both at domestic and international levels. Since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s, as this thesis was intended to demonstrate, Russia has 
focused on retaining its status as a great power although it has encountered 
numerous problems on the domestic front.
Nevertheless, there are still questions begging to be answered regarding 
Russia's foreign policy: Has Russia, for instance, been successful in projecting an 
image o f influence and power despite its numerous domestic difficulties such as 
suffering from an economic or industrial depression? I would argue that it has 
been rather successful considering its resources. In addition, in spite o f its 
domestic concerns, Russia has managed to maintain a coherent stance in its 
relation with the G-7 powers mostly because of its dependency on them from a 
financial point o f view.
How has the evolution of Russia's foreign policy affected the post-CoId 
War international political system? To answer this question, one should consider 
the fact that Russian foreign policy has been a reflection of domestic problems. 
Furthermore, this question generates other questions such as: What would provide 
support for Russian power domestically and internationally after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union? (Lynch 2001, 8). The answers to these questions can be found
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in Russia's search for its national identity, or by explaining the political core of 
“Russianness.” This study aimed at explaining Russia's foreign policy towards the 
leader of the coalition of the Western countries i.e. the United States. This task, 
however, has proved to be an onerous one since Putin's foreign policy appeared to 
be based on opportunism devoid o f its transparency or clear definition. 
Furthermore, explaining policy's concept in the context of a state which lacks 
institutions and domestic coherence i.e. the two main conditions for a functioning 
internal government, challenges one's aim.
Putin's measures to remedy Russia's undesirable domestic situation which 
was weakening its international position, however, were bought at a high price. 
Putin's move of retreating from democracy was justified by the need for solving 
other problems first (i.e. security, stability and economy) prior to the enforcement 
of Russia's concept of democracy. The economic growth and prosperity were 
about to become the triggers of the democratization o f the political system.
Anatoly Adamishin, a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR and 
former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, argues that 
Russia should look to its past in order to find new solutions for its future foreign 
policy: “Russia, which is becoming increasingly self-confident yet is still 
undecided as to where it should channel its new energy,” he maintains, “should 
take a look at its recent past, especially at the acute turning point in history that 
marked the end o f the Cold War” (Adamishin 2008). He also provides an 
interesting answer to the question: What path will Russia take? He refers to the 
analysis offered by many experts according to whom, in order to overcome the 
crisis o f the 1990s, Russia was forced to revert to an authoritarian regime as the
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country was not yet ready to become a genuine democracy. Adamishin, in the 
following quotation, anticipates a democratic future for Russia and admits that 
only democratic political system enables the country to attain its aim. As he 
explains, “perpetuating forms of a political system that closely resemble those that 
proved to be untenable in the period that was fatal to the Soviet Union would 
mean making the same historical mistake. Strength may prove to be illusory. If a 
country wants to feel confident on the international arena and to react to outside 
impacts quickly and adequately, it must build its home life in accordance with 
political parameters that produce the greatest economic effect and the best quality 
of life. This is particularly true at the present time of globalization and rapid 
technological progress. Russia will not get away from democracy” (Idem).
In short, foreign policy under Putin appeared to be flexible and pragmatic 
on the outside, but remained unreconstructed, based on ideology and even became 
increasingly assertive in its fundamental aspects. Although he tried to grasp the 
importance of openness and deal making, his premises were rather based on 
geopolitical considerations. In many ways, Putin is not a classical realist because 
his view of the world is not solely confrontational, and he accepts globalization as 
part of the modem world. Among his achievements I would emphasize his 
reassertion of Russia's presence in the former Soviet republics and the 
consolidation of relations with the United States and the European Union. On the 
contrary, I would classify the bankruptcy o f his plans for a renewed hegemony 
and the exclusive domination of Russia in the region as his personal failure. Putin 
only had to put up with Russia's greater influence in the region, in other words 
with a “balance o f power.” Putin's perspective relies on both cooperation and
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completion, aspects which automatically incline his views towards familiar and 
rather traditional interpretations of security. Putin's claim that Russia is a part of 
Western European culture on one day, and a part of Eastern culture the next, lies 
at the heart of his foreign policy. Russia has continued to claim “balanced” 
foreign policy as far as geopolitics is concerned, which, in other words, means 
pro-European when dealing with its European partners, Transatlantic when 
dealing with the United States, Eurasian, Asian or “Eastern” when dealing with 
Asia and pro-integration when dealing within the members of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. However, in order for Russia to even begin to be regarded 
as a great power, it needs to prove itself not only on the regional, but also on the 
global stage.
The tasks set by Russian foreign policymakers to win back as much of the 
former Soviet Union superpower status as possible while advancing the further 
development and stabilization of the Russian Federation may seem to be in 
conflict. On the other hand, today’s Russia can enjoy an environment which is 
favorable to the social, political, and economic modernization of life in countries 
in need of such reformation. The Russian leading elite could thus put more effort 
into solving its domestic problems. The United States and other Western countries 
would like to see Russia as a strong and responsible partner, sharing the same 
democratic values, which is why the Kremlin should stop inventing new enemies, 
whether internal or external, that supposedly aim at weakening Russia's 
geopolitical potential, as well as any of Russia's national interests, and promote 
instead a comprehensive cooperative relationship with the West including the
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United States. The threat Russia can face today is not coming from abroad, but 
rather from the regime enforced by Putin during his two mandates as President.
Some scholars (Sergei Medvedev among others) argue that Putin's bid to 
anchor Russia in the West after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 reverses the traditional 
and imperial paradigm and that Russia is departing from a centuries-old imperial 
tradition deeply embedded in the national psyche. For my part, I would argue that 
such a departure from this tradition does not indicate “realignment” in Russia's 
foreign policy, but it has served in the sense of reaffirming Russia as a global 
player. Putin's pragmatism thus only served as an instrument in the gradual 
fulfillment of his ideology.
By using the words of Dmitri Trenin let me conclude this thesis: “If Russia 
maintains its independence and distinctive character in term of foreign policy, the 
country will be capable, in the very long term, of occupying a place on the 
international scene as a “Third West” (alongside America and Europe), but that 
will require very significant internal changes, and also a fundamental 
modernization of foreign and defense policy” (Kuchins and Trenin 2004, 150).
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Abstract
This MA thesis is an empirical case study based on an evaluation of 
English language sources. The major aim of the thesis is to analyze and to explain 
Russia's foreign policy towards the United States during the presidency o f 
Vladimir Putin between 2000 and 2008. The paper employs the concept of 
offensive realism as theoretical framework. The first parts of the paper describe 
the domestic determinants underlying Russia’s foreign policy, with a focus on the 
Russian public debate on searching for a new national identity following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The next chapters deal with the key issues in 
the U.S.-Russian relations after President Putin's accession to power. In this 
context, particularly discussed is the war on terror after 9/11. The paper argues 
that Russia's foreign policy under Putin is characterized by a very intriguing 
interaction between ideology and pragmatism. Its main interest is to restore its 
once lost superpower status.
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